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Why Judicial Review?  
Malcolm Langford 
Abstract 
Despite the flourishing of judicialisation of rights across the world, scepticism is not in short supply. 
Critiques range from concerns over the democratic legitimacy and institutional competence of courts 
to the effectiveness of rights protections. This article takes a step back from this debate and asks why 
should we establish or persist with judicial review. For reasons of theory, methodology, and practice, 
it argues that closer attention needs to be paid to the motivational and not just mitigatory purposes 
for judicial review. The article examines a range of epistemological reasons (the comparative 
advantage of the judiciary in interpretation) and functionalist reasons (the attainment of certain 
socio-political ends) for judicial review and considers which grounds provide the most convincing 
claims in theory and practice.   
Keywords: Judicial review; rights; legal and political theory; constitutional theory; international 
adjudication 
 
1. Introduction  
Why should we support judicial review? What factors should count in motivating a 
political community to establish or sustain an institutional practice that permit judges a 
final or authoritative say on questions of rights?1 Or, to put it in the language of 
normative legitimacy,2 what outputs does judicial review offer that might help overcome 
qualms over process concerns such as democratic representativity or policy distortion?  
This question is, of course, not new. The voluminous debate on judicial review stretches 
back to the US Supreme Court’s iconic judgment in Marbury v. Madison in 18033 and, 
more locally, to a similar decision by the Norwegian Supreme Court in 1820.4 However, 
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1 In this sense, judicial review in administrative law is excluded from the focus. 
2 See generally, Allen Buchanen, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
3 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (U.S. Supreme Court). However, US state courts had exercised this 
power much earlier: see Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion has Influenced the 
Supreme Court and shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009). 
4 Eivind Smith, 'Constitutional Courts as “Positive Legislators” - Norway' (International Academy of 
Comparative Law, XVIII International Congress of Comparative Law 2010). This judgment was 
undoubtedly influenced by the American experience, but it is arguable that it was equally a product of 
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it is a question worth revisiting in light of ongoing theoretical contestation and 
contemporary legal developments. The question of why we need judicial review is never 
far from the minds of those engaged in constitutional reform processes and efforts to 
extend the adjudicative reach of international human rights regimes.5 If judicial review 
is to be defended, an interrogation and articulation of its potential value in general 
seems necessary at the outset. It is not sufficient to offer up a list of fine-grained 
mitigatory reasons that serve only to soften critiques. 6  Moreover, establishing 
motivational reasons creates and frames the space for a serious encounter with different 
critiques: it ensures that the debate is not operating at cross-purposes.  
This article begins in section 2 by considering why we should be concerned about the 
motivational question for judicial review. Section 3 provides a critical assessment of the 
epistemological claim that judges possess a comparative advantage in interpretation. 
Section 4 examines various functionalist arguments, in which judicial review helps 
secure certain socio-political ends. The article concludes with an assessment of which 
grounds are the most convincing. 
A word on method. The question at hand can be answered on multiple planes. On the 
one hand, I situate each of the motivational claims and counter-claims within political 
and legal philosophy. Such arguments are highly stylised, possess numerous 
assumptions common to political philosophy,7 and use a largely moral calculus in 
assessing costs and benefits. On the other hand, the paper also plays the ‘science game’, 
to use Pinker’s depiction.8 Each motivational claim is assessed as to whether it is 
sufficiently consistent with: (1) theory from the social sciences about how actors actually 
behave; (2) empirical evidence of such behaviour from studies in law, political science 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indigenous factors in Norwegian political and judicial development: see Rune Slagstad, 'The Breakthrough 
of Judicial Review in the Norwegian System' in Eivind Smith (ed.) Constitutional Justice Under Old 
Constitutions (Kluwer Law International 1995), 81, 82, for a background.  In the first 46 years of 
constitutional review, the Norwegian court largely issued brief, formal conclusions, although these were 
the subject of public and legal debate: ibid. It was only in 1866, in Wedel Jarlsberg Ufl 1866 p. 165 
(Supreme Court of Norway), at 172 that the Chief Justice formally articulated the grounds and method for 
exercising judicial review, which carries a doctrinal resemblance to Marbury. See further Eivind Smith, 
Konstitusjonelt demokrati (Fagbokforlaget, 2009), 43 and Slagstad, ibid 96.  
5 Note that the question posed here is not one of standard legal method, which can be answered by 
pointing to legal sources: the ’constitution of X says so‘ or ‘Article 2 of the ICCPR says so’. Various legal 
sources may embody and signal good reasons for adopting judicial review; and they may also compel its 
use in practice. See, e.g., ‘General Comment 9, The domestic application of the Covenant’ (Nineteenth session, 
1998), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) (CESCR), para. 3. However, such foundations do not offer an 
independent normative justification.  
6 Andrew Petter, 'Taking Dialogue Theory much too Seriously (or Perhaps Charter Dialogue isn't such a 
Good Thing after All)' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 147, 147. 
7 See, for example, Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press 1989) and Jeremy 
Waldron, 'The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review' (2006) 115 The Yale Law Journal 1346. The latter 
sets up his critique with four such assumptions: democratic institutions are procedurally ‘in reasonably 
good working order’; the judiciary is well-functioning (independent and oriented towards institutional 
tasks of hearing complaints, resolving disputes, and upholding the rule of law); there is a commitment by  
‘most members of the society’ to the ‘idea of individual and minority rights’; and there can be reasonable 
disagreement over the content of rights and each position is held with sufficient ‘sincerity’. p. 1360.   
8 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (W. W. Norton & Company 1997), 55. 
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and sociology; and (3) diverse national contexts.9 There is of course a clear limit as to 
how much theory, jurisprudence and empirical findings can supplement to a 
philosophical reflection. Nonetheless, I provide sketches and summaries in order to 
provide a much richer gloss on the validity of the morally-oriented arguments.    
 
2. Judicial Review and its Critics 
Why should we be concerned with the normative motivations for judicial review? There 
are at least three reasons. The first is theoretical: There is a tendency in the current 
literature to focus on epistemological arguments (both for and against) to the neglect of 
functionalist arguments which are more commonly found amongst practitioners. The 
second is methodological: being clear about the purpose of judicial review is crucial in 
navigating the various debates about the legitimacy, competence, and effectiveness of 
judges. The third is practical: reasons offered for judicial review appear to shape both its 
institutional reach and jurisprudential trajectory. Each of these justifications is briefly 
examined in turn. 
2.1. Theoretical framing 
Greater attention to the motivations for judicial review is necessary in the theoretical 
literature as certain reasons have dominated the discussion. Broadly speaking, it is 
possible to divide potential motivational grounds into two categories: epistemological 
and functional. Epistemological arguments emphasise the comparative advantage of the 
judiciary in interpretation. In divining the meaning and application of a particular right, 
courts are said to be more reliable in interpretive exercises than legislatures and 
executives. Functionalist arguments are epistemically modest although possibly more 
empirically demanding. It is not presumed that courts possess greater moral insight 
than other branches of government; rather, judicial review garners its institutional 
advantage through its socio-political function(s).  
In the prevailing scholarship on the legitimacy of judicial review, epistemological 
reasons are endowed with a certain pre-eminence. In this universe of argument, we find 
methodological agreement between two of the most-cited bookends of the debate. 
Dworkin establishes the question as follows: ‘The best institutional structure is the one 
best calculated to produce the best answers to the essentially moral question of what 
the democratic conditions actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those 
conclusions.’10 Likewise, this epistemic baseline stands central in Waldron’s critique of 
the substantive legitimacy defences of judicial review: ‘Outcome-related reasons, by 
                                                        
9 In this respect, it is consistent with the idea of global legal research espoused by William Twining, 
General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
However, it seeks to avoid unconscious ethnocentrism or “jurisditionalism”. Twining counsels that ‘claims 
to “universality” or “generality” of concepts, norms, or empirical facts should be treated with caution if 
they are based on familiarity with only one legal tradition’ (p. xviii).   
10 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law (Oxford University Press 1996) 34. 
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contrast, are reasons for designing the decision-procedure in a way that will ensure the 
appropriate outcome (i.e., a good, just, or right decision)’.11  
This typology is not watertight. Both types of reasons can be nestled together. Ronald 
Dworkin often adds a functional claim to his epistemic one: ‘democracy requires that the 
power of elected officials be checked by individual rights’ and the ‘responsibility to 
decide when those rights have been infringed is not one that can be sensibly be assigned 
to the officials whose power is supposed to be limited’. 12  Other authors offer 
coterminous and longer justificatory lists.13 Moreover, the claims can substantively 
overlap. To take Dworkin again, he sometimes asserts the interpretive advantage of the 
judiciary in more functionalist tones: judicial intervention is said to not only ensure, on 
balance, better answers but it also restructures public discussion about rights by 
foregrounding principled reasoning. 14  Nonetheless, in legal and political theory 
epistemic reasons are often foregrounded, which suggests that we need a more critical 
analysis of this methodological choice. Moreover, these grounds are somewhat divorced 
from the functional and instrumental reasons that are commonly marshalled in practice 
for establishing the institution of judicial review.  
Equally, we need to think carefully about which types of functional reasons should count 
and how. For instance, in a recent article, Fallon repeats the classical lines of a functional 
argument:15 Courts must possess the opportunity to invalidate legislation because the 
mere existence of legislation is likely to be more harmful to rights.16 Judicial review 
provides therefore a critical and additional veto check against such risks.17 However, as 
shall be seen, Fallon’s reasoning has been subject to significant critique on the grounds 
that it cannot account for the multitude of legislation that seeks to positively protect 
rights.  
2.2. Methodology 
A second reason for examining motivational reasons is the methodological role they play 
in debates over legitimacy, institutional competence, and effectiveness. For normative 
                                                        
11 Waldron (n 7) 1373. 
12 Ronald Dworkin, 'Constitutionalism and Democracy' (1995) 3 European Journal of Philosophy 2, 10. 
13 David Bilchitz, Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2007) provides a long list of reasons to support judicial review which 
cover both categories: time, independence and principles, expertise, absence of bias, accountability and 
justification, and particularity of decision-making (pp. 119-132). 
14 ‘The public participates in the discussion – as it has in the United States, for example, about abortion, 
school prayer and many other issues – but it does so not in the ordinary way, by pressuring officials who 
need their votes or their campaign contributions, but by expressing convictions about matters of principle’. 
Dworkin (n 12) p. 11.   
15 In Norway, see M. Kinander, Grunnlovsfesting av sosiale rettigheter – en dårlig idé, Civita, 13 April 2014. 
16 Richard Fallon, 'The Core of An Uneasy Case For Judicial Review ' (2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1693. 
‘In a nutshell, the best case for judicial review in political and morally healthy societies does not rest on 
(as has often been asserted) on the idea that courts are more likely than legislatures to make correct 
decisions’. ibid 1695. Emphasis in original. 
17 ‘The best case … rests on the subtly different ground that legislatures and courts should both be enlisted 
in protecting fundamental rights, and that both should have veto powers over legislation that might 
reasonably be thought to violate such rights’. ibid.  
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legitimacy assessments, it is common to weigh process against output reasons in 
establishing when a particular coercive institution is legitimate or not.18 In Waldron’s 
well-known critique of judicial review, its undemocratic features are weighed against its 
supposed epistemic outputs. Given his cursory approach to setting out the motivational 
reasons for establishing judicial review, it is possible that his balancing assessment 
might be different if a broader palette of reasons were included.  
Similar cost-benefit or balancing approaches are taken in debates over the institutional 
competence of the judiciary. It is often asked whether judges should possess powers to 
review complex and polycentric issues, ranging from national security through to the 
allocation of limited budgetary resources. The concern is that courts risk distorting 
efficient and effective public policy. In addressing this tension, Jeff King sets up an 
expertise-accountability trade-off: the quality of expertise for a government’s position 
(institutional competence) is to be balanced against the risks to individual rights 
(accountability function of judicial review). Thus, when a State cites “collective” 
expertise (a position endorsed by a government agency/department, UN agency, or 
professional association) this ‘greatly skews the accountability trade-off towards 
deference to expertise’.19 However, King’s analysis privileges one functional reason for 
judicial review. As we shall see, there might be other grounds that justify judicial 
intervention when his trade-off favours strong judicial abstention or deference.  Thus, 
the question is of relevance to the judiciary itself as it weighs competing factors in 
deciding when and how to exercise its discretionary powers. 
A growing literature has also tracked the effects of rights adjudication.20 A key question 
in designing such research is determining what types of impact we expect from courts. 
The principal schools of thought have focused on either material impacts (changes in 
policies and social realities)21 or symbol and constitutive impacts (changes in politics 
and attitudes);22 although others straddle both camps. As Scheingold put it, ‘it is 
                                                        
18 Buchanen (n 2). 
19 Jeff A. King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012), 234. He does acknowledge that 
that ‘accountability’ concerns can be become so sharp that ‘expertise’ concerns are dismissed, ibid 233, 
but his examples in the book suggest that such cases are rare.  
20 See, e.g., Varun Gauri and Daniel Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press 2008); Beth Simmons, 'Should 
States Ratify? Process and Consequences of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR' (2009) 27 Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights 64; Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How 
the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (Cambridge 1998); Valerie Hoekstra, Public Reaction to Supreme 
Court Decisions (Cambridge University Press 2003); César Rodríguez Garavito and Diana Rodríguez-
Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global 
South (Cambridge University Press 2015); David C. Thompson and Faith E. Crampton, 'The Impact of 
School Finance Litigation: A Long View' (2002) 28 Journal of Education Finance 133; Laurence Helfer and 
Erik Voeten, 'International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe' (2014) 
68 International Organization, 1; Malcolm Langford, Ben Cousins, Jackie Dugard and Tshepo Madlingozi 
(eds.), Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance? (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
21 Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (University of Chicago Press 
1991). 
22 Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (The University 
of Chicago Press 1994). 
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necessary to examine both the symbolic and the coercive capabilities which attach to 
rights’.23 To a large extent, this research is guided by an underlying normative debate on 
the legitimacy or usefulness of judicial review and public interest litigation.24 Yet, it is 
interesting to observe that there are fewer empirical studies on some of the normative 
reasons for adjudication analysed in this article, in particular the epistemic quality of 
judicial reasoning and the effects on deliberative reasoning. 
2.3. Practical effects: A patchwork of judicial review  
The final reason is that motivational grounds appear to affect the design and trajectory 
of judicial review in practice. On the one hand, the judicialisation of rights has flourished 
across the world in the wake of the Cold War.25 Numerous courts occupy an important 
and sometimes central place in the protection of constitutional and international rights. 
This transmogrification is evident in the constitutional reforms in a swathe of new 
democracies,26 constitutional renewal and heightened judicial engagement in older 
democracies (including Norway),27 and a spreading tapestry of international courts and 
complaint mechanisms.28 The twinning of electoral democracy with national and 
international judicial review constitutes a persistent feature of contemporary 
constitutional reform and practice. Exclusion of the latter from this equation is typically 
met with strong domestic and international protest.29 Further, there is an expansion of 
rights that are subject to review. From a limited number of narrowly framed civil rights, 
adjudicators are now ruling on a broader swathe of rights as well as duties. As Figure 1 
                                                        
23 Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Social Change (Yale University Press 
1974). 
24 This is not to imply that unintended or unforeseen impacts, whether positive or negative, should not be 
analysed. Indeed, any full assessment of the justification or legitimacy of judicial review should 
incorporate the full palette of effects and consequences. 
25 For an early global attempt to overview rights jurisprudence, see Nihal Jayawickrama, The Judicial 
Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
University Press 2002). While the form of judicial review varies, there is a clear embrace of either the US 
Supreme Court model, the neo-Kelsenian German Federal Constitutional Court, or a mixture of both. In 
most cases, courts are armed with power to strike down legislation and demand or trigger new laws and 
policies. 
26 This was the case across Eastern Europe, almost all of Latin America, and many countries in Southern 
Europe, Africa, and Asia.   
27 Other examples include Canada, Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand. This process was also facilitated by 
the incorporation of international human rights treaties in domestic law, e.g., the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in the United Kingdom and a raft of treaties in the Norwegian Human Rights Act 
1999.  
28 For an overview, see Karen Alter, 'The Global Spread of European Style International. Courts' (2012) 35 
West European Politics 135, 135. 
29 Witness the response to recent constitutional crises in Egypt and Hungary when judicial review was 
under threat from strong executives: see Tom Perry and Marwa Awad, 'Egypt's Mursi to meet judges over 
power grab' Reuters (November 26) <available at http://www.reuters.com/> and Keno Verseck, 
'Constitutional Reforms: Hungary Steps Away from European Democracy' Spiegel International (11 March) 
<available at http://www.spiegel.de>. 
Oslo Law Review 2015 Issue 1   42 
 
demonstrates, there has been a remarkable and commensurate rise in the constitutional 
recognition of various civil and social rights.30  
Figure 1 Trends in Constitutional Rights: 1970-200531 
 
 
Yet, this trend is not universal. The reach of judicial review does not extend to the four 
corners of the world. For a start, many Asian and Middle Eastern States cannot be found 
on this constitutional map: courts in these regions are granted fewer powers and are 
more tightly restrained, while international treaty protocols for individual complaints go 
unratified.32 For example, the average level of acceptance of international human rights 
adjudicative mechanisms is strikingly low for these two regions: 1.05 and 0.6 compared 
to 3.08 for the rest of the world. Yet, these States ratify substantive human rights treaties 
at a rate just below the global average.33 Conforming with Ginsburg’s observation of the 
emergence of national judicial review, the presence of electoral democracy is largely a 
                                                        
30 The trend remains clear and startling even if we adjust for the fact there has been an increase in the 
number of States in the period 1970-2005: the average increase in recognition of these rights falls from 
691 per cent to 459 per cent. The number is determined by UN membership: see 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml. 
31 The source of the original data is the CCP Data Set http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/. In 
order to transform it into times series data, it was determined whether for each year a constitution (dated 
by its most significant recent reform, usually at a time of democratic or post-colonial transition) included 
the particular right. As the recognition of some rights may be through earlier amendments to the 
constitution there is likely to be a margin of error. However, the overall trend is fairly clear.  
32 Note that some States may ratify a human rights treaty or incorporate constitutional rights with no 
intention at the time of fulfilling the rights or judicial orders for their enforcement. In other words, they 
are the ‘false positives’: see generally Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2009).  
33 These were calculated through the use of the Human Rights Treaty Index, created by the author.  
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necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining acceptance of international human 
rights review.34 While judicial review has emerged, sometimes surprisingly, in more 
authoritarian regimes, it is often highly fragile.35  
However, ambivalence is not constrained to regions that with a sizeable share of 
authoritarian and anocratic36 governments. In more mature democracies, constitutional 
reform processes have halted at the door of enhanced judicial review.37 Recently, in 
Norway, parliamentarians could not agree on formalising the Supreme Court’s powers of 
judicial review which it had claimed and exercised for 194 years.38  In Europe and Latin 
America, different coalitions of States have sought to weaken the powers of regional 
human rights bodies39 while the tribunal for the Southern African Development 
Community was stripped of its powers to consider individual complaints.40 Moreover, 
this uncertain picture of State commitment may be evident in assertions of patchy 
compliance with judgments, including by some Western European democracies.41  
Jung and Rosevear argue that there has been a slowdown in constitutional recognition of 
judicial review of social rights. Noting the lower rate in the period 1990-2004 compared 
to the period 1974-1989,42 they suggest that the rise of the Washington-based 
consensus tempered recognition. However, this statistical and causal interpretation is 
questionable, and using the same data, Figure 2 reveals that the general trend line 
remains upwards.43 Nonetheless, what the graph does demonstrate is the equal 
                                                        
34 It explains 91 per cent of the coverage of adjudicative mechanism. The residual is ratification of the 
Optional Protocol to CRPD by Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Note that it is only a necessary condition: 
some electoral democracies such as India, Pakistan, and Indonesia have not accepted a single international 
human rights complaint mechanism.  
35 See, e.g., Zhushi [2008] 15 (Supreme Peoples' Court of China). 
36 Hybrids of authoritarianism and democracy. 
37 In Australia, a national consultative process led recently to recommendations for a charter of civil rights 
backed by weak or dialogical judicial review; yet, neither mainstream political party has taken the 
proposal forward. 
38 It was finally confirmed in 2015. See Arnulf Tverburg, ‘Høyesterett, Stortinget og prøvingsretten’, 
Lovdata, 12 June 2015, available at 
https://lovdata.no/artikkel/hoyesterett_stortinget_og_provingsretten/1569 (accessed 28 June 2015). 
39 For instance, the recent Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights permits a single 
judge to decide on the admissibility of complaints and to reject claims that do not evince a ‘significant 
disadvantage’ - which many States consumed resources and were not worthy of international adjudication. 
The Brighton Declaration by Council of Europe Member States seeks to take this process further by 
tightening other admissibility conditions and making the margin of appreciation doctrine more explicit. 
High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 
April 2012. 
40  Nicole Fritz, 'SADC leaders hot air blows down Tribunal' OSISA  <available at 
http://www.osisa.org/law/blog/sadc-leaders-hot-air-blows-down-tribunal>. 
41 See, e.g., OSJI, From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human Rights 
Decisions (Open Soicety Justice Initiative 2010). 
42 Courtney Jung and Evan Rosevear, 'Economic and Social Rights Across Time, Regions, and Legal 
Traditions: A Preliminary Analysis of the TIESR Dataset' (2012) 30 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 372, 
381. Note that they use only the dataset of 136 countries minus the ten western countries. However, the 
exclusion of these ten countries does not change the results. 
43 We would generally expect a gradually plateauing of the line as fewer States are left in the pool, which 
would suggest that a logarithmic curve should be calculated. However, during this period the number of 
States has also increased discounting the assumption behind that approach. The trend would be even 
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persistence of the non-recognition of judicially enforceable social rights during recent 
constitutional reform.44 This was notable in Norway’s recent constitutional reform: The 
right to education and the social rights of children were included in a reformed bill of 
rights, but the right to health and adequate standard of living were rejected by a 
parliamentary super-minority.45 
Figure 2. Constitutional Recognition and ICESCR Incorporation over Time46 
  
Does this patchwork of institutionalisation reflect normative differences over the 
importance or risks of judicial review? Explaining the rise of judicialisation is the subject 
of a growing body of empirical work. Thus, the fragmented nature of expanded judicial 
review suggests that normative dissensus remains a factor. It is not just a matter of time 
before policymakers, the legal profession and the entire public become accustomed to 
the idea; it is a site of deeper disagreement. This makes the march of judicial review less 
inevitable and more conditional on changes on ideas as much as politics and culture.  
 
3. Epistemological Arguments  
Epistemological justifications of judicial review tend to be the preserve of political 
philosophers, legal theorists, and lawyers. Like others, Michelmann sets up the inquiry 
as one of deciding which institution is able to ‘get the basic laws, including all morally 
telling interpretations of them, right’.47 Importantly, the question is usually phrased in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
higher if we included recent constitutional reforms in Kenya, Egypt, Uruguay, Timor and Fiji amongst 
other countries. 
44 Indeed, the correlation scores are very low: R2 = 0.03 for figure 2A, R2 = 0.05 for Figure 2B.  
45 Arnulf Tverberg, ‘Ny vår for menneskererettighetene i Grunnloven?’, Lovdata, 12 June 2014.  However, 
section 92 appears to have made the entire ICESCR judicially reviewable. 
46 In Figure 2B, the year of constitutional adoption was presumed to be the year of ICESCR incorporation 
though this was adjusted in one case to a later date. 
47 Frank Michelmann, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton University Press 1999), 59. Emphasis added. 
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relative rather than absolute terms. Which institution is most ‘likely’ to arrive at, or 
‘better’ at arriving, the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ answer?48 In essence, it concerns the reliability 
of interpretation. 
The clear challenge for epistemological claims for judicial review is the existence of 
reasonable disagreement. Rights are a quintessential “under-theorised agreement”, 
permitting a range of plausible interpretations. In hard cases, this interpretive ambiguity 
is put to the test. As Tushnet states: 
[C]onstitutional provisions are often written in rather general terms. The 
courts give those terms meaning in the course of deciding whether 
individual statutes are consistent or inconsistent with particular 
constitutional provisions. But as a rule, particular provisions can 
reasonably be given alternative interpretations. And sometimes a statute 
will be inconsistent with the provision when the provision is interpreted 
in one way, yet would be consistent with an alternative interpretation of 
the same provision.49   
To compound matters, interpretive differences are not confined to disagreement 
between the different branches of government. Judges can be divided amongst 
themselves: synchronically (majorities, minorities, and separate opinions), 
hierarchically (differing views between upper and lower courts), or diachronically 
(reversal of earlier decisions).  
The odyssey of Sherbert v. Verner in the United States exhibits dramatically all three 
features. 50  In the case, a South Carolina government agency refused to grant 
unemployment benefits to Mrs Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. 
While local job opportunities were available, she claimed that such employment was not 
possible because it required working on a Saturday, the Sabbath in her religious 
denomination. By a majority of 7 to 2, the US Supreme Court held in its 1963 judgment 
that a law or rule which substantially interferes in effect with the free exercise of religion 
can only be justified on two grounds: it constitutes a ‘compelling state interest’ and no 
‘alternative forms of regulation’ are available. Applied to the facts, they found in favour 
of Mrs Sherbert.51  
                                                        
48 See, e.g., ibid Wojciech Sadurski, 'Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights' (2002) 22 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 275, 278. 
49 Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press 2008), 20. 
50 Tushnet, ibid 20, uses the case to simply illustrate disagreement over time, but it constitutes a striking 
example of all three forms of judicial disagreement. 
51 Sherbet v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (Surpeme Court of the United States), 403 (Justice Brennan for the 
majority). Now, the Court is not pronouncing here on the meaning of the right. In each of these cases 
under discussion, the state could have made an exemption: indeed, the state or Oregon responded to the 
judgment by exempting from its criminal statute the religious use of peyote. However, by graduating the 
level of scrutiny of different types of interferences with the right, it in a sense delineating what is in the 
core of right. 
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The doctrine stood for 27 years but in 1990, the same court, by a majority of 5 of 4, 
loosened or abandoned the strict scrutiny test in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith. In overruling the Oregon Supreme Court, which had found 
that the use of the drug peyote in a Native American church ritual could not constitute 
grounds for employment dismissal and the subsequent denial of unemployment benefits, 
they found that interferences were only invalid if imposed with the intention of harming 
religion.52 In effect, the Court confirmed the alternative logic and interpretation of the 
original Sherbet dissenters. 
Beyond revealing intra-judicial disagreement within courts, across courts, and over time, 
the case reveals even more about the extent of the disagreement. First, the US Congress 
emphatically disagreed with the 1990 decision and passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (unanimously in the House and by 97 to 3 in the Senate). Yet, in a 
subsequent ruling, the US Supreme Court partly overturned the Act on the basis that 
Congress sought to usurp the Court’s interpretive power over the constitution.53 
Secondly, the diachronic direction of judicial disagreement was not predictable. It is 
often assumed that courts are unidirectional and dynamic, such that rights protections 
expand over time.54 Here, the right to religious freedom was significantly curtailed by 
the Court and its greatest impact appears to have fallen on minority religions: Judaism, 
Islam, and Native American religion. Thirdly, the form of legal reasoning was not 
foreseeable. Predominant legal theories of interpretation did not correspond with their 
protagonists in the Court. The most famed originalist, Scalia, devoted not a hairbreadth 
of analysis to the intention of the Framers of the US Constitution. Rather, he placed great 
weight on contemporary circumstances and the turmoil the Sherbert rule would create 
in a society characterised by religious diversity.55 It is the dissenting minority that 
invokes the originalist claim, along with other arguments, and it is Justice Blackmun who 
returns to the struggle of the founding fathers to win and constitutionalise religious 
liberty.56 
Such puzzling dissensus also extends to the international level. The European Court of 
Human Rights and UN Human Rights Committee have divided along similar lines on 
religious freedom. In one instance, they came to dramatically different conclusions 
concerning the same applicant and the same issue. In Mann Singh v. France, the Court 
found a challenge to the prohibition on the wearing of a turban in a driver’s licence 
photo to be a ‘manifestly ill-founded’ claim.57 Yet, the Human Rights Committee in (Mann) 
                                                        
52 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Supreme Court of 
the United States), at 878, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority.  
53 The law could apply to federal government but not to the states and local government 
54 Indeed, Mark Tushnet (n 49), makes this point repeatedly in his book despite his gesturing towards this 
case as an example of reasonable disagreement. 
55 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, p. 888. 
56 ‘I do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a 
“luxury,” but an essential element of liberty -- and they could not have thought religious intolerance 
“unavoidable,” for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance.’ ibid. p. 
909. 
57 Mann  Singh v. France, Application no 4479/07 (Judgment 13 November 2008) (ECHR). 
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Singh v. France, found a violation of religious liberty for a ban on the use of a turban for a 
passport photo.58 It held that the State’s objective of identification for public safety was 
irrational. If the applicant always wore a turban, a “turban-less” image would not assist 
officials wishing to identify him. 
This extended vignette on religious freedom exposes reasonable disagreement in its 
different forms in the variegated and shifting landscape of judicial review. In the two 
dominant doctrinal approaches surveyed, strict and deferential review on religious 
interference seem reasonable on first blush. Although the former is clearly more 
protective of individual rights, the ebb and flow of these cases seem to raise real 
questions over the comparative advantage of the judiciary.  
Isolated cases, however, do not hammer nails into the coffin of an argument. The 
epistemological claim is more measured: judges are more likely to arrive at a better 
interpretation. Such a strategy permits a proponent of judicial review like Dworkin to 
both defend the institution and criticise individual judgments,59 particularly those of the 
current U.S. Supreme Court. While conceding that judges will ‘inevitably disagree’, he 
asserts that the reasoning of the present majority in a range of decisions ‘cannot be 
justified by any set of principles that offer even a respectable account of our past 
constitutional history’.60 The move also allows Dworkin to maintain his notion that 
almost all cases will contain the “right” or “best” answer, even if only discernible by a 
Herculean superjudge.61   
Nonetheless, this strategy does not address the methodological challenge. Can we be 
sure that courts will more consistently arrive at better interpretations? And, if so, under 
what conditions? The problem is that there is no clear and agreed upon aggregative 
metric or ruler that we can put under constitutional interpretations of courts, legislators, 
and executives to determine which is the most epistemologically reliable. The most 
effective route is arguably longitudinal qualitative and partly quantitative analysis, 
which may reveal the underlying motivations of different actors and the wisdom of their 
considerations. The problem is that one is usually reduced to tracing individual or small 
samples of interpretations; and one can find courts and legislators behaving badly (and 
decently).62  
                                                        
58 Singh v. France Communication no 1928/2010, Decision on the Merits, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010 (2013) (UN Human Rights Committee),  
59 This distinction is sometimes overlooked by critics. For example, Wojciech Sadurski (n 48), appears to 
mischaracterise Dworkin in this way. 
60 Ronald Dworkin, 'Bad Arguments: The Roberts Court & Religious Schools' The New York Review of Books 
- Blog. Indeed, the unified legislature and cross-political alliance that sought the restoration of the Sherbet 
test suggests that the Supreme Court might have erred significantly. 
61 Ronald Dworkin, 'My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk about 
Objectivity Anymore' in WJT Mitchell (ed.) The Politics of Interpretation (University of Chicago Press 1983), 
287. ‘I have insisted that in most hard cases there are right answers to be hunted by reason and 
imagination’. ibid viii. 
62 A constructive example is Mark Tushnet (n 49), who does so, acknowledging the limitations and then 
challenges proponents of judicial review to come up with counter-examples.  
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Proponents of judicial review tend not to travel too long down that path. Rather, they 
point to certain defining features of judicial review that suggest that courts will arrive at 
better answers. It is a “forward-looking” method that presumes “favourable conditions” 
generates “a good outcome”.63 We can categorise these as the: (i) authenticity of case-
based review; (ii) the semi-public mode of deliberation; and (iii) the form of decision-
making. Each will be examined in turn. These epistemic arguments may be compelling 
but deserve close consideration. They all draw on particular institutional attributes of 
courts, and as the legal process school in particular has sought to emphasise, 
institutional features may not consistently correlate with the quality of judicial 
reasoning.64  
3.1. The authenticity of case-based review: Evidential particularism 
A commonly-cited epistemic advantage of judicial reasoning is its factual palette: the 
particularity and authenticity of concrete cases. The argument runs that legislative and 
executive reasoning tends to be dominated by general and stylised considerations. Yet, 
at least in the field of individual rights, such reasoning may be less appropriate, 
occluding the practical and problematic effects of rules (or lack thereof) on disparate 
individuals. Bilchitz sets out this critique of legislatures in customary fashion: 
General decision-making across a range of cases can obscure the problems 
that may arise in particular instances to which that general decision may 
apply. General decision-makers may simply overlook or fail to give 
sufficient weight to the problems that may be faced in particular cases.65 
The claim is alluring enough. It resonates deeply with the defence of judge-made 
common law in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Rules and principles develop and mature 
best through the inductive and analogical reasoning of courts in actual cases, avoiding 
the ‘perils of prophecy’ through a ‘long course of trial and error’. 66  In rights 
jurisprudence, the scenario is common enough. A law may be highly defensible on 
general grounds, but its impact falls disproportionately, whether unfairly or unwittingly, 
on particular individuals or groups. Video surveillance, efficient criminal trials, religious 
education, conditions for unemployment benefits and so on may constitute positive 
public aims, but their consequences are unlikely to impact individuals in a uniform 
manner.  
Nonetheless, there are serious problems with this argument (putting aside its somewhat 
anti-democratic overtones). First of all, it is equally possible to encounter the reverse 
scenario. Laws may be motivated by very particular situations without regard for their 
                                                        
63 On discussion of this method generally, see Jon Elster: ‘Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of 
Constitution‐making’ in Tom Ginsburg (ed.) Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge, 2002), 15, 17. 
64 On this point, see Lon Fuller, 'The Form and Limits of Adjudication' (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353.  
65 Bilchitz (n 13), 127. 
66 Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (Little, Brown & Co 1938), p. 51, cited in Donald 
Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (The Brookings Institution 1977). 
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general and systemic effect on rights. A terrorist bombing, the abuse of social benefits by 
one family, an alleged rape by a member of an ethnic minority, a surge in homelessness 
in urban business districts, may all trigger legislative solutions that possess no 
generalised justification or grounding in empirical reality. In these circumstances, we 
would want courts to lift rather than concentrate the perspective.67 Thus, we may wish 
to fully reverse Bilchitz’s position and ask whether the legislature has properly engaged 
in ‘general decision-making across a range of cases’ and evaluated the systemic impacts 
of rights, which may be represented (not just actualised) by an individual in a legal case.  
It might be retorted that over the last two centuries, the degree to which legislation is 
targeted at such specific groups has waned in mature democracies. Nonet and Selznik 
describe a general shift from repressive legal regimes to autonomous and responsive 
law. 68  Repressive law is concerned the maintenance of order and selective 
subordination in the interests of the rulers and elite, while autonomous law offers 
impartial, neutral, and equal treatment and responsive law attends to the needs and 
values of the disempowered and disadvantaged. But vestiges of repressive law persist 
and its potency remains latent.69 Every policy narrative requires an “enemy” and, even 
when law and politics are framed in autonomous terms, repressive motivations may be 
observable if not transparent.  
A good illustration is A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department.70 The 
September 11 bombings in New York led the British parliament to embellish its fresh 
and comprehensive Terrorism Act of 2000. Foreigners could be detained and deported if 
the relevant government minister believed they were a risk to national security and 
suspected their involvement in international terrorism. The provision created a “prison 
of three walls”: detainees could voluntarily leave for their home or third country. Yet, if 
they did not or could not due to fears of torture, detention would continue ad nauseum. 
While passing the law, the government sought to immunise it from challenge by making 
a derogation order from rights to liberty and security in the European Convention on 
Human Rights on the grounds of a public emergency.  
The primary question for the House of Lords was not whether a general rule had 
particular effects. The law was all about particularity: its force was trained on a 
particular group – to which all eleven defendants as foreigners belonged. Instead, the 
court was confronted with three general questions: Was there a public emergency 
                                                        
67 Waldron (n 7), p. 1379, makes a similar point – noting the tendency of legislatures to enact cases on the 
basis of notorious individual cases – but then states in the same breath that these same legislatures are 
then better placed to weigh the issues involved. The argument doesn’t necessary follow of itself.  
68 Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law (Transaction 
Publishers 1978), p. 21: ‘under appropriate conditions, specific processes emerge that tend to transform 
ad hoc prebureacratic decision-making into more systematic bureaucratic decision-making’. 
69 Nonet and Selznick note the continuing relevance of repressive law in contemporary society: ibid. p. 116. 
70 A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (House of Lords, United 
Kingdom). 
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justifying the derogation? Was the legislation proportional to its aim?71 Finally, was it 
discriminatory against foreigners? The majority sided, somewhat reluctantly, with the 
government on the first question on the grounds that, in determining the existence of a 
public emergency, the executive possessed greater institutional competence and 
benefitted from a wide margin of appreciation.72 Yet for the rest, the answer was 
negative. The legislation failed the proportionality test. The use of immigration 
measures was unlikely to advance the stated security goals: deportees would still be free 
to plan attacks against the UK, as would nationals.73 It was also discriminatory: no 
reasonable and objective criteria existed for imposing harsher treatment on non-
nationals given the considerable number of British citizens involved in or suspected of 
international terrorism.74  
Of relevance are the considerations that were weighed. The particular circumstances of 
the defendants did play a role: the court took seriously the consequence that innocent 
foreigners could be held incommunicado ad infinitum.75 However general considerations 
were equally important in the proportionality test, and ultimately decisive. They 
revealed an inconsistency between the legislative measures and the stated aims. Not 
only was the law difficult to square with the need for generalised equal treatment, the 
law, as one commentator put it, made ‘no sense in security terms’.76  
Secondly, even if we persist with the individualist perspective, it may be empirically 
limited. The particularity justification may be just that - rather particular to Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Not all constitutional and international rights cases arrive in the 
form of individual complaints. The form of judicial review varies significantly.77 
Adjudicators in many jurisdictions are granted the power to abstractly review 
legislation, issue advisory opinions, and entertain complaints by legislators or 
collectives/organisations. These powers are particularly prevalent in civil law 
jurisdictions, while liberal standing rules in some common law countries permit public 
interest complaints. The latter two powers exist in regional quasi-judicial procedures 
and the final in some southern common law countries, particularly South Asia. To 
varying degrees, the production of factual evidence and evidence of particular violations 
                                                        
71 Even if derogation is justified by a public emergency, Article 15 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights provides that any derogation must be ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.  
72 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, for the majority, paras. 26-29.   
73 ‘The choice of an immigration measure to address a security problem had the inevitable result of failing 
adequately to address that problem (by allowing non-UK suspected terrorists to leave the country with 
impunity and leaving British suspected terrorists at large) while imposing the severe penalty of indefinite 
detention on persons who, even if reasonably suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda, may harbour no 
hostile intentions towards the United Kingdom.’ Lord Bingham of Cornhill, for the majority, para. 43.   
74 ibid. para. 68. 
75 See quotation at footnote 27.  
76 Walker (2008: 1143). 
77 On institutional features, see the global overview in Tom Ginsberg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: 
Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge 2003), 34. 
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is required, but it may not be central to the case. Moreover, some adjudicatory bodies 
may launch investigations and inquiries.78 
It might be objected that this criticism is unfair. Not all defenders of judicial review 
support abstract or collective forms of review. In their view, a lack of particularity may 
deprive the claim of legally manageable content79 or the meaningful context for the 
interpretation and application of a right.80 This is partly true. The individualised 
structure of much judicial review does carry certain benefits, although perhaps more of 
a functional than epistemological kind. 81  But collective forms of review offer 
complementary benefits. As will be argued later, it can ameliorate the critique that rights 
are too individualised in their focus, capture the collective dimension embedded in most 
rights, provide broader guidance and legal certainty to the meaning of particular 
provisions and allow courts to rule on important questions when individual applicants 
are pressured to abandon or settle their claims. 
Waldron goes a step further and labels the particularist virtues of Anglo-American 
courts a mere ‘myth’.82 In appellate review, the traces of ‘the original flesh-and-blood 
rights-holders’ have “vanished” as the argument becomes more abstract. According to 
him, complainants are selected by advocacy groups ‘in order to embody the abstract 
characteristics that the groups want to emphasize as part of a general public policy 
argument’.83 This critique is pertinent though overstated. In the common law world, the 
factual record from lower courts is left largely intact (although it can be more easily 
contested in civil law jurisdiction). Moreover, while public interest advocates do try to 
identify more sympathetic claimants and narratives, their degree of control over 
litigation can be marginal.84  
                                                        
78 For example the UN Committee against Torture, Committees on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
79 Tara Melish, 'Rethinking the 'Less as More' Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Americas' (2006) 39 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
(JILP) 1, 61: ‘A justiciable claim is nevertheless generally described as one involving a live controversy 
between adverse parties … Its contours serve to concretize disputes in judicially-manageable ways, 
delimiting the types of claims appropriate for judicial review’. 
80 Bruce Porter, 'The Crisis of ESC Rights and Strategies for Addressing It' in John Squires, Malcolm Langford 
and Brett Thiele (eds.), The Road to a Remedy (2005), 48, 52: ‘Rights adjudication must begin with the 
individual context of each claim’- although, see conditioned support for collective claims in Bruce Porter, 
'Canada: Systemic Social Rights Claims and a Partial Defence of Soft Remedies' in Malcolm Langford, Cesar 
Garavito-Rodriguez and Julieta Rossi (eds.), Making it Stick: Compliance with Social Rights Judgments 
(Cambridge Unveirsity Press, 2015), ch. 7. 
81 The consequences for rights protection may be clearer: See section 4.2 below. 
82 Waldron (n 7), 1379. 
83 ibid 1379. 
84 Advocates and social movements do not have decisive control over who litigates, when they litigate, and 
how they litigate. For example, Thomas M. Keck, 'Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial 
Decisions on LGBT Rights' (2009) 43 Law & Society Review, notes how the American gay and lesbian 
movement tried tactically and strategically to halt early litigation by LGBT individuals wishing to marry 
but with little success. The extent to which civil society support structures are a determining factor of 
litigant success is debated in the literature: cf. Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and 
Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (University of Chicago Press 1998); Bruce Wilson, 'Rights 
Revolutions in Unlikely Places: Costa Rica and Colombia' (2009) 1 Journal of Politics in Latin America 
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Yet, Waldron is right in pinpointing the generalised element of judicial review. In 1976, 
Chayes identified this feature as a particular turn in civil law from that of retrospective 
and bipolar litigation dominated by individualised remedies to the more forward-
looking model of public law characterised by multiple parties, a more predictive and 
evaluative approach to fact-finding and the presence of structural or general remedies.85 
The Chayesian paradigm shift is of course highly stylised. It ignores the long tradition of 
these general features in private law the fact that that most public law cases are modest 
in ambition or concern individualised administrative remedies.86 However, Chayes is 
most likely correct that general considerations may be more prominent in cases that 
seek ‘vindication of constitutional or statutory rights’ rather than ‘private rights’.87  
To sum up, the particularity of judicial review may give the courts a slight epistemic 
advantage over legislators and executives. Though if adjudication can and should 
concern broader principles and policies, questions remain over a judicial comparative 
advantage on this terrain, as we shall see in section 2.3. Two further factors may ground 
such a claim. 
3.2. A semi-public deliberation: Informational exposure, decisional seclusion  
Adjudication is a unique institution on account of various structural features which 
work in opposite directions. In theory, the judiciary is fully exposed to an array of 
arguments and facts but is secluded from political pressure, permitting it to make non-
partisan or principled decisions. An adjudicator is an extroverted perceiver and an 
introverted decision-maker, making them sensitive to conflicting accounts but 
independent in judgment.  
The first characteristic is a hallmark of deliberative democracy theory. Robust exposure 
to different views is said to produce better decision-making. Michelmann sets up the 
question as to comparative epistemic advantage as follows: 
(O)ne condition that you think contributes to greatly to reliability is the 
constant exposure of the interpreter – the moral reader – to the full blast 
of the sundry opinions on the question of rightness of one or another 
interpretation, freely and uninhibitedly produced by assorted members of 
society listening to what the others have to say out of their diverse life 
histories, current situations, and perceptions of interest and need.88 
                                                                                                                                                                             
59;and Jackie Dugard and Malcolm Langford, 'Art or Science? Synthesising Lessons from Public Interest 
Litigation and the Dangers of Legal Determinism' (2011) 26 South African Journal on Human Rights 39. 
Advocates may search for ideal cases that may best fit a particular narrative, but the messiness of reality 
tends to intrude and the narrative may be quickly reshaped by media, judges, and commentators. 
85 Abraham Chayes, 'The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation' (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1281, 
1282. 
86 As to the first, Chayes, ibid 1283, acknowledges that this ‘traditional conception of adjudication is no 
doubt overdrawn’. 
87 ibid 1284. 
88 Michelmann (n 47), 59. Emphasis added. 
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Even though evidence from empirical research on deliberative democracy suggests that 
these assumptions have limits and defects,89 we can accept for the moment that 
interpretive reliability improves with full argument and informational exposure. The 
question is whether courts possess any particular comparative advantage, structurally 
or in terms of the different incentives and costs different actors possess in accessing 
information.  
The second structural characteristic of judicial deliberation is the requirement of 
impartiality and independence. The political insulation of the courtroom may allow 
dispassionate, and consequently better, reasoning. Sibley argues that conduct can only 
be ‘deemed reasonable by someone taking the standpoint of moral judgment’ and this 
often requires the intervention of a third party:90 
To be reasonable here is to see the matter – as we commonly put it – from 
the other persons point of view, to discover how each will be affected by 
the possible alternative actions; and, moreover, not ‘merely’ to see this (for 
any merely prudent person would do as much) but also be prepared to be 
disinterestedly influenced, in reaching a decision, by the estimate of these 
possible results.91  
These features of informational exposure and decisional seclusion can be captured 
within a principal-agent model, as done in effect by Kis.92 We begin by asking why 
political authority is delegated first from the people to elected representatives. In Kis’s 
view, most mature democracies prefer a system of electoral democracy over direct 
democracy because ordinary citizens face challenges in obtaining relevant information. 
Condorcet’s jury theorem – that a majority is more likely to get the right result than a 
minority - does not work at scale. Referenda generate few incentives for citizens to 
become fully informed since the weight of their respective vote is so small: it approaches 
zero as the population becomes large. Bentham made precisely this exact point in 1788: 
‘the greater the number of voters the less the weight and value of each vote, the less its 
price in the eyes of the voter, and the less of an incentive he has in assuring that it 
conforms to the true end and even in casting it all’.93   
Thus, the greater the complexity of the issue and the more information needed the ‘more 
serious the danger that the voters’ judgment will not be just unreliable but subject to 
some systematic distortion’.94 On balance, Kis concludes that representative institutions 
have an epistemic advantage over citizens. The costs of accessing and processing 
information is low (due to economies of scale, research staff, and bureaucratic channels) 
                                                        
89 See the overview in David Ryfe, 'Does Deliberative Democracy Work?' (2005) 8 Annual Review of 
Political Science 49.  
90 W.M. Sibley, 'The Rational Versus the Reasonable' (1953) 62 The Philosophical Review 554, 557. 
91 ibid. 
92 János Kis, 'Constitutional Precommitment Revisited' (2009) 40 The Journal of Social Philosophy 570.  
93 Jeremy Bentham, ‘Lettre d’un Anglois’, in Jemery Bentham, Rights, Representation and Reform (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1788/2002), 35, cited in Elster (n 63), 22. 
94 Kis (n 92), 580. 
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and the incentives are high (better deliberation could produce more votes).95 The result 
is that the main tool citizens possess in a democratic process is one of accountability, 
namely periodic elections: it ‘permits the citizenry to remain sovereign while paying 
obedience and commands issued by a representative assembly’.96  
With the rise of complexity in modernity, this account has a certain resonance. 
According to Stone Sweet, enhanced complexity generates a demand within dyadic 
relations (two entities) for more triadic forms of governance, by parliaments, executives, 
and judiciaries.97 It also coheres with certain empirical research. Hibbing and Thiess-
Morse note the paradoxical positions of voters in surveys and focus group studies.98 
While participants expressed a preference for significant control over decision-making, 
few expressed a preference for strong direct democracy.99 They warmed initially to the 
idea of direct rule but quickly raise feasibility concerns, many of them related to 
complexity and lack of information. Such research does not rule out a role for direct 
democracy - it is arguably a powerful means to catalyse and tame rather than manage 
and direct the political process -100 but it reveals the limits to its contribution and 
support.  
Returning to Kis, this comparative advantage of legislators over citizens can nonetheless 
generate its own perverse effects. The asymmetry of information between the elected 
and the electors invites the more “predatory” politician to adopt ‘mistaken electoral 
beliefs’ in order to avoid electoral defeat.101 If rights are affected, this is serious ‘because 
collective self-government depends on each citizen being treated as an equal’.102 As 
citizens in most jurisdictions lack direct levers of control over the judiciary, the risks of 
the judiciary falling prey to this moral hazard is comparably less. Thus, the very feature 
that makes courts susceptible to charges of democratic illegitimacy may strengthen their 
epistemological capacity.  
It is not too difficult to identify cases in which courts correct predatory information 
asymmetries. In the seminal prison litigation cases in the USA, it was strikingly 
                                                        
95 In addition, he makes the point that that legislation may often be inconsistent with the majoritarian or 
general view since there may be different reasons why representatives do not follow through on electoral 
promises or public opinion. ibid pp. 583-7. 
96 ibid 587.  
97 ‘To the extent that TDR [triadic rulemaking] is effective, it lowers the costs of dyadic exchange; as dyadic 
exchanges increase in number and in scope, so does the demand for authoritative interpretation of rules; 
as TDR is exercised, the body of rules that constitute normative structure steadily expands becoming more 
elaborate and differentiated’:  Alec Stone-Sweet, 'Judicialization and the Construction of Governance' 
(1999) Comparative Political Studies 147, 158. 
98 John Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 'Process Preferences and American Politics: What the People want the 
Government to Be' (2001) 95 American Political Science Review 145, 149.  
99 The overwhelming majority placed themselves in the middle of spectrum between direct and 
institutional democracy. 
100 Yannis Papadopoulos, 'How does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on 
Politics and Policy‐making' (2007) 24 West European Politics 35. 
101 Kis (n 92), 588. 
102 ibid. 
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revealed.103 Until the 1970s, all branches of government in the State of Alabama had 
declined to address prison conditions; there was clearly no electoral gain in addressing 
the problem. While courts had acted traditionally in a highly deferential manner, it was 
the instigation of litigation in 1971 that eventually permitted a full and public 
description of prison conditions, a system ‘so thoroughly pervaded by violence, 
overcrowding, inedible food, and brutal methods of punishment’.104 The force of the 
evidence was so strong that even the state’s attorney general conceded that they had no 
case to advance. The entire prison system was ruled unconstitutional.105 A cursory 
reading of the European Court of Human Rights judgments on police brutality and 
prison conditions in Western and Eastern European States makes for equally salutary 
reading. 
Moral hazard, though, is just one feature of informational asymmetry. Kis could have 
strengthened his case by an analysis of both the resource and time constraints and 
disincentives to deliberate that representative institutions face. The deliberative 
democracy school emerged precisely due to the concern that legislatures lacked the 
willingness or capacity to meet deliberative criteria, such as reciprocity (providing 
mutually acceptable reasons), publicity (a sufficiently open forum) and accountability 
(deliberating with and giving reasons to relevant agents).106 The reasons for this 
informational asymmetry are practical and structural. 
Practically, there is a limit to the time legislators can devote to reflection, deliberation 
and constituent consultation; and staff and bureaucrats may be unable to generate 
sufficient or quality analysis on the topic.107 In most parliaments across the world, there 
is an enormous volume of legislation and regulation that must be accommodated. 
Modern parliaments operate therefore under severe time constraints and strictly 
regulate the time spent on debating legislation.108  
Structurally, legislatures are not designed for public deliberation but rather for the 
creation and maintenance of legislating and/or governing majorities and, depending on 
the political conditions, the aggregation of citizen preferences. There is no reason why 
public deliberation should be the dominant modus of legislative reasoning: negotiations, 
deals, threats etc. are all part of the political modus. Moreover, ‘If a representative is 
guided by factional or short-term interest, no amount of deliberation can induce an 
                                                        
103 See generally Feeley and Rubin (n 20). 
104 Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press 2001), 21. 
105 Newman v. State of Alabama 349 F.Supp. 278 (M.D.Ala. 1972) (District Court of the United States, 
Middle District of Alabama).  
106 James Bohman, 'Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy' (1998) 6 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 400, 408.  
107 Tushnet (n 49) at least concedes this – noting how interpretations of legislators and executive officials 
tend to be regularly skewed in certain directions: ibid. p. 157. Although, he attempts to partly base this on 
the existence of judicial review and the irresponsibility it may breed amongst legislators and officials. 
108 Herbet  Döring, 'Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda' in Herbert Döring (ed.) 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Campus Verlag 1995). 
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impartial stance’.109 Scholars have pointed to deliberative paradox thrown up by 
legislative processes: if discussions occur publicly, parties may be more likely to harden 
their bargaining position which defeats the point of genuine deliberation.110  
The combination of these constraints and incentives are evident in practice. Reviewing 
literature on European parliaments, Rasch concludes that:  
In general, plenary debates on legislation in assemblies of (at least) 
parliamentary systems tend not to be deliberative. Arguing seldom affects 
information and preferences in a way that become important at the final 
voting stage. Outcomes almost always are known in advance…. Instead, it 
is much more common for legislators to use plenary debates as an arena 
for stating their reasons, revealing their preferences and explaining their 
vote – primarily to outside party members, media and the general 
public.111  
This finding contradicts claims by judicial review critics such as Waldron who praise 
legislatures as paragons of deliberation. Waldron writes, ‘In this regard, it is striking 
how rich the reasoning is in legislative debates on important issues of rights in countries 
without judicial review.’112 Yet, his only example is a debate on abortion in the British 
parliaments from the 1960s. Also, he fails to reconcile his own normative perspective 
with his own empirical observations: he has bemoaned earlier the lack of debate in the 
New Zealand parliament, characterising it as an ‘empty chamber’.113 
Overall, this quasi-deliberative claim for courts is attractive. In the context of fully 
fleshed-out litigation, a court may be exposed to a greater volume of relevant 
information and informed expertise and address these in a disinterested and thoughtful 
manner. However, there are four significant caveats. 
First, not all cases are complex. Kis acknowledges for instance that complexity may not 
loom large for the general public on some issues, particularly issues of ‘personal 
morality’.114 He names capital punishment, gay marriage or affirmative action since 
‘people have the opportunity for acquiring shared experience’.115 This fact may explain 
why both laws and jurisprudence on these issues arouse significant controversy, and 
both legislators and courts risk charges of elitism. Nonetheless, even here, Kis notes the 
importance of information. Judicial intervention may help deepen the understanding of 
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111 Bjørn Erik Rasch, 'Legislative Debates and Democratic Deliberation in Parliamentary Systems' 
(Presentation at the Oslo-Yale International Workshop on Epistemic Democracy in Practice, Yale 
University, New Haven, 20-22 October. 2011) . 
112 Waldron (n 7), 1384. 
113 Jeremy Waldron, 'Compared to What?—Judicial Activism and the New Zealand Parliament' (2005) New 
Zealand Law Journal 441. 
114 Kis (n 92), 580. 
115 ibid 581. 
Malcolm Langford – Why Judicial Review?  57 
the causes of inequality, which may be needed in order to assess clams for affirmative 
action or gays and lesbian rights, particularly if one has had no interaction with the 
persons who would benefit from the law.  
Secondly, the informational advantage of courts is both conditional and contextual. 
Legislative and executive members can avail themselves of information and expertise 
from parliamentary committees, public consultations, in-house legal expertise and 
closer attention to mass media,116 while the significance of predatory political behaviour 
for rights may vary considerably. As to the adjudicatory process, it possesses its own in-
built constraints: significant time and resources can be consumed by procedural 
machinations and cases vary considerably in terms of exposing courts to a full range of 
opinions and facts. Indeed, the strictures of legal method and argument may screen out 
morally relevant information and arguments (see further discussion in section 2.3). 
Moreover, while adversarial litigation generally allows weaker parties a chance to more 
fully put their case, alternative or more fine-grained opinions may not secure a hearing 
unless there is a good process for amicus curiae briefs, expert opinions and 
media/public exposure of on-going litigation.  
Thirdly, exposure does not equate to comprehension. What is missing in Kis’ account is 
the differential capacity of both institutions to process complex information. Judiciaries 
are not experts across all policy domains and face, like any institution, their own 
challenges with complexity. The trend towards expert decision-making agencies is 
unmistakable. As will be argued in the next sub-section, the judiciary is adept at 
expanding their expertise within cases and over time, but one cannot overstate their 
capacity.  
Fourthly, the assumption that courts are independent from politics is contested. Decades 
of empirical research on judicial behaviour demonstrate that legal reasoning is only one 
factor in decision-making.117 Indirect political pressures or personal ideology may 
compromise judicial independence. The extent to which judiciaries are independent will 
be taken up later, but for now it is important to note the dilemma.  
3.3. The mode of decision-making: Justification and method 
A final epistemic advantage may arise in the mode of judicial deliberation: the form and 
substance of reasoning. As to form, judges must State their reasons.  For those obliged to 
provide public and written justification, certain expectations are common: a logical and 
defensible progression of argument; a demonstration that relevant facts and competing 
views have been considered; and awareness that the decision has consequences. 
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Conversely, it might be thought that other branches of government are not so formally 
constrained. Legislation is passed without any formal process that demands coherent 
and rigorous reason giving. 
This argument has merit but, ultimately, its force is modest. Empirically, not all courts 
are compelled to provide reasons.118 Judges in some civil law jurisdictions (e.g. France) 
provide scant reasoning: authority is presumed to flow from hierarchy and the proper 
operation of the legal process. Such a result is consistent with the centralised ordering of 
the civil law judiciary with rigorous internal systems for maintaining legal consistency 
across decisions.119 This is to be contrasted with the decentralised and coordinate 
common law systems. Individual judges possess enormous powers that must be justified 
publicly to political actors and other members of the judiciary:120 reasons emerge as an 
important form of accountability.  
However, one should not overstate the discrepancy between legal systems. In some 
instances, it a difference in style: e.g., Germanic-influenced courts prefer a highly 
deductive and impersonal style of form and reasoning. Moreover, there is considerable 
intra-jurisdictional borrowing in the contemporary design and reform of judicial 
systems. In particular, the rise of constitutional and international rights review has 
prompted courts lower in the chain to be more expansive in their statement of reasons. 
Otherwise they risk being perfunctorily overruled. The European Court of Human Rights 
has demanded that on certain topics reasons must be given or easily discernible from 
judicial findings (such as determination of criminal guilt).121 The Court’s justification of 
its position is apposite in highlighting the reason-centric focus of legal process:  
[F]or the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and 
indeed the public, must be able to understand the verdict that has been 
given; this is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness. As the Court has often 
noted, the rule of law and the avoidance of arbitrary power are principles 
underlying the Convention … In the judicial sphere, those principles serve 
to foster public confidence in an objective and transparent justice system, 
one of the foundations of a democratic society…122 
Turning to the legislative side of the equation, we should ask whether legislatures 
experience analogous opportunities, pressures, and incentives to state reasons. Further, 
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do they develop reason-giving cultures over time? Structurally, there are grounds for 
thinking so. Legislation is debated in parliament, often in repeated phases. Justification 
for positions on at least particularly controversial issues will be demanded by the media, 
constituents, opposition politicians, and possibly more diplomatically by bureaucrats. 
The result is that the legislative record can contain substantive reasoning. In four case 
studies of constitutional questions in legislative debate, Tushnet draws back the curtain 
to reveal a certain level of reason-giving, such as legislative attention to constitutional 
rights, parliamentary committees which scrutinised legislation, and the expansion of 
legal advisors within the executive and legislative branches.123 From this he draws the 
conclusion that ‘the performance of legislators and executive officials in interpreting the 
constitution is not, I think, dramatically different from the performance of judges’.124  
However, the argument in favour of legislatures can be taken only so far. First, as 
discussed earlier, there are constraints and incentives that operate to restrict the level of 
deliberation. These are part of the calculus of legislators. Secondly, the statements of 
reason tend to be thin. Tushnet argues that sometimes there is ‘flesh on the bones’ in 
legislative debates, but he acknowledges that most of the times the reasoning constitutes 
‘skeletons’ of argument.125 While he counter-asserts that this is not much different from 
the verbal discussions between justices, 126 the fact is that judges are at least required to 
set out those reasons. Even if they may be a rationalisation of intuitions, according to the 
legal realist tradition, they must be transparent. They can provide the basis for 
substantive discussion, occasionally in the media but at least amongst the contesting 
parties, policymakers, politicians and the legal profession.  
These considerations might lead us to count the stating of reasons as a slight form of 
epistemic advantage for courts. However, we have only considered form. We must also 
ask a more substantive question: do the methods used by courts produce more reliable 
interpretations? This is a much more difficult challenge. And, it is at this point, that the 
twinning of moral and legal epistemological arguments for judicial review splinters, 
twists, and potentially falls apart. 
The legalistic reflex is to defend the method of judicial reasoning by reference to 
doctrinal expertise. In interpreting constitutions and treaties, judges are more likely to 
follow an established legal method as the relevant legal system dictates: placing the 
correct weight on legal text, precedent and practice, principles and theories, case and 
background facts etc. Yet, this very modus of reasoning may count against the courts. If 
the metric for reliability is good moral reasoning, recourse to legal method may 
demonstrate precisely why we do not want courts to be given the task of rights 
interpretation. As Waldron puts it, judicial review does not provide ‘a way for a society 
to focus clearly on the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights’ but rather 
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‘distracts them with side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation’.127 He notes, 
however, that in contemporary constitutions, the gulf between quality moral reasoning 
and acceptable legal reasoning may not be as great.128  
This framing presents a sharp choice: If the case for judicial review rests on quality legal 
reasoning, it is open to the normative charge that it may be poor moral reasoning. If the 
case rests on quality moral reasoning, it is open to the empirical critique that the 
reasons judges give must be more legalistic in nature. It seems one has to choose.  
Yet, some critics would not even allow that. They would go even further and claim that 
the first choice is fallacious: courts are not engaged in anything that can be substantively 
identified as legal reasoning or method. Courts are principally guided by moral and 
political convictions rather than any objective or external legal criteria.129 Stated legal 
reasons are but a subterfuge. Thus, one is only left with an argument from the 
standpoint of moral reasoning and that is likely to be weak if the official legal reasons 
are covering unstated moral preferences. This critique is overdriven. No one school of 
thought has empirically explained judicial outcomes as discussed above.130 Gibson’s 
observation from 1983 seems to stand the test of time:  
In a nutshell, judges' decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, 
tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what 
they perceive is feasible to do. Thus, judicial decision making is little 
different from any other form of decision making. Roughly speaking, 
attitude theory pertains to what judges prefer to do, role theory to what 
they think they ought to do, and a host of group-institution theories to 
what is feasible to do.131 
Nonetheless, the realist or attitudinalist point demonstrates, at least, that one has to be 
cautious in resorting to legalistic defence of interpretive method.  
How can the argument be saved? There are at least three ways forward in trying to re-
scramble the egg of law and morality. The first and most common way forward is to limit 
the scope of the claim to a subset of areas where the two clearly overlap. The legal 
process school, among others, argues that the articulation of rights and duties should be 
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limited to those areas where the judiciary has institutional competence. In Lon Fuller’s 
classic treatment of institutional competence, adjudication is positively viewed as 
contributing a distinct form of decision-making to public policy: ‘a form of social 
ordering institutionally committed to ‘rational decision’ that is based on ‘participation 
through proofs and arguments’.132 However, judges are likely to make mistakes in 
adjudicating in areas where they must access information not presented by parties or 
that trigger complex and polycentric repercussions of a judgment. 133  This 
consequentialist argument fits neatly with some liberal arguments that judicial review 
thus should be limited to negative liberty rights.134 Therefore, we might be more 
comfortable that courts will be more reliable in these sorts of cases.  
However, the argument struggles on various points. Most of the controversial cases 
discussed in this piece have involved classical liberty rights. Such a demarcation of 
competence may be arbitrary or a mere historical reconstruction.135 In addition, courts 
have developed various techniques to improve their access to information and expertise 
in more complex cases, from amicus curaie submissions through to experimental and 
reflexive doctrinal techniques and remedies.136 Such approaches seek to maximise the 
respective competences and contributions of the courts and other branches of 
government to solving a problem. 
A second and alternative way forward is to embrace the standard of moral reasoning 
and contend that courts are superior in this respect.137 Dworkin does this in four moves. 
First, he argues that in practice lawyers and judges ‘instinctively treat the Constitution 
as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be applied to concrete cases 
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through fresh moral judgments.’ 138  Secondly, while he concedes it would be 
‘revolutionary’ for judges to make such a concession,139 he argues that this moral 
approach largely fuses with legal method. This is because basic legal rights are framed in 
abstract moral terms: treating them as moral rights constitutes the only sensible means 
of legal interpretation.140 Thirdly, he contends that moral reasoning on rights must be 
based on principles rather than policy: there must be “distributional consistency from 
once case to the next” because rights ‘do not allow for the idea of the strategy that may 
be better served by unequal distribution of the benefit in question’.141 Finally, courts as a 
“forum of principle” are better placed for such a task. They are constrained by ‘articulate 
consistency’:142 Legislatures and executives are likely to give undue weight to policy 
considerations due to their orientation towards the advancement of “general 
welfare”.143  
Dworkin’s defence of courts as forums of principle is compelling in the abstract but is 
practically limited. His later model of “law as integrity”, which embeds judges more 
firmly in their legal context (Anglo-American although potentially exportable to civil law 
systems), places a constraint on principle-based reasoning. In the “chain gang”, judges 
are both backwards and forwards-looking: seeking to both fit their chosen principle 
with previous interpretations and the best available and contemporary moral 
interpretation.144 Such coherence may not always be achievable. As the Sherbet saga 
showed, judges are likely to possess different preferences for weighing the past and 
future. A further constraint is Dworkin’s acknowledgement that rights can be relative as 
much as absolute: they are not always full trumps: sometimes, policy considerations will 
be strong enough to dominate.145 The necessary weighing of arguments raises the 
question of judicial expertise, their capacity to determine the weight or force of policy 
considerations, something Dworkin does not address yet is common in almost all rights 
cases.  
Dworkin’s best case seems to be that courts will generally give more weight to moral 
principles but that legal precedent and policy considerations may sometimes dominate. 
Even if we accept this argument, it is not patently clear that it amounts to the most 
compelling case for judicial review. Dworkin’s approach ends up mirroring the sorts of 
claims by the legal process school – that judges are expert in one type of approach. In 
this case, it is principles rather than discrete cases.  
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However, if courts are called to also assess various policy considerations, we should 
expect them to be up for this task. This provides a third way forward. What is notable in 
the religious freedom and counter-terrorism judgments discussed above is the presence 
of significant consequential reasoning by courts - their close scrutiny of the policy-based 
claims of governments. However, the overall picture is different from Dworkin’s: courts 
emerge not so much as forums of principle, with immaculate moral reasoning, but rather 
as forums of principled pragmatism. It is a mode of reasoning well summarised and 
promoted by Carter and Burke. They argue that ‘well-reasoned legal decisions’ are those 
fit best together ‘the facts established at trial, the rules that bear on the case, social 
background facts, and widely shared values’, rather providing epistemic clarity: ‘Law 
does not provide a technique for generating “right answers”’. 146 
If principled pragmatism were the standard, how would courts perform? Most 
parliamentarians and ministers also aspire to be principled pragmatists - marrying 
value or ideological commitments with complex reality. Given that rights tip the balance 
in favour of principled reasoning, we might expect generally courts to have some 
epistemic advantage. However, some of the cases discussed above suggest that courts 
can be superior in consequential reasoning and inferior in principled reasoning.  
3.4. The limits of epistemological justifications  
Are courts better placed to interpret rights? Of the various arguments traversed above, 
the strongest arguments for adjudicators are their political seclusion and their bias 
towards principled forms of reasoning. Their relative freedom from partisanship and the 
demands of coherence seem particularly to enhance the prospects of reliable 
interpretation, at least legally and possibly morally. Epistemological reliability might be 
enhanced further when courts are better exposed to the particularities of alleged rights 
violations, are able to secure a broad evidential and informational base, and are required 
to state fully reasons.  
Nonetheless, none of these features provides a knockout blow. On balance, courts 
emerge with some sort of prima facie interpretive distinction, but how significant is it? 
Moreover, will it endure in the most important or significant rights cases? In many ways, 
the epistemological and somewhat legalistic justification of rights review suffers much 
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the same problem as the notion of representative and deliberative parliamentarism. 
Both ideas are heavily stylised and vulnerable in practice - so-called ‘nirvana fallacies’.147 
In addition, an emphasis on the epistemological virtues of judicial review brings 
potential adverse consequences for rights practice. It encourages the conflation of 
judicial reasoning with the “real” meaning of rights. Such conflation might, of course, be 
instrumentally beneficial for compliance: it adds to the authority of judicial reason. Yet, 
it is also perilous. There is the danger of rigidity: the ideational or legal space for 
alternative moral and political conceptions of rights (whether more expansive, 
restrictive, or contemporary) is diminished. Further, it may encourage courts to be risk 
adverse. Judges may reason that restraint or refuge in doctrines such as justiciability is 
to be preferred to a charge of incompetence or illegitimacy. A legal and institutional 
environment open to the prospect of judicial infallibility may encourage both judicial 
dynamism, sensitivity, and innovation. 
 
4. Functionalist Arguments  
These lukewarm epistemological conclusions provide the appropriate departure point 
for a different set of arguments, which can be described as functionalist. By functional, I 
mean a goal-centred instrumentalism and not the empirical school of structural-
functionalism.148 Framed by an institutional logic, functionalist claims begin in essence 
from the assumption that the judiciary is a political actor and that the legal process is a 
form of politics - not electoral politics but rather a distinct judicial politics. On its face, 
this observation does not challenge a positivist conception of adjudication, which 
accepts that law serves instrumental and political ends. However, we might 
acknowledge that law is inflected internally by a certain politics as judges use discretion 
to shape trial procedure, select and weigh facts, interpret and apply ambiguous language, 
and craft remedies. 
In thinking about functional justifications, three arguments seem to motivate the choice 
of judicial review: (i) social stability; (ii) accountability; and (iii) structured public 
deliberation. Each will be discussed in turn. As will become clear, these choices are 
motivated by features that are clearly specific to judicial review of rights. I am less 
convinced by functionalist motivational claims for which there are clear alternatives to 
courts. The result is that the arguments draw on many of the specific features of the 
legal process identified above but strip away the pretension that law is fully insulated 
from politics as the epistemic dimension is given less weight.  
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The other consequence is that I do not consider some common functionalist arguments. 
This includes the claim that courts facilitate the adaption of constitutions to new social 
circumstances: the same role can be played by constitutional amendment.149 Likewise, I 
briefly consider but dismiss the inclusion of democracy amongst the motivations for 
judicial review. While tempting, such arguments are better trotted out in a more modest 
manner at the mitigatory level, in response to concerns that judicial review is anti-
democratic.150 Nonetheless, the motivational arguments addressed herein possess 
shades of representative, participatory and deliberative democracy, to which I will 
allude. Moreover, there may be some specific national contexts in which the democratic 
function of judicial review is more salient.  
4.1. Political legitimation and trust building  
The first functional role of judicial review is the most ephemeral. Judicial review 
provides one answer to a foundational question in political theory and practice: how to 
justify the coercive power of the State or majoritarian-based government.151 By pointing 
to judicial review of basic rights, an assurance is offered to individuals who must comply 
with law or who may suffer its neglect. Authority is legitimated accordingly through the 
guarantee of certain procedural and substantive protections.  
This reciprocal function of judicial review produces two instrumental benefits of 
normative significance. First, it may constitute a condition precedent for the initial 
formation of a “demos” or political community. Secondly, it may help build and maintain 
trust within society over time, particularly between distrustful factions, groups or 
classes. Social trust is increasingly recognised as crucial to achieving most ends in a 
modern State.152  
Curiously, this function of judicial review reverses an assumption that is thought to 
disqualify it, namely plurality of opinion. The very existence of disagreement between 
individuals and groups, together with uncertainty over the consequences of majoritarian 
rule, may precipitate the establishment of judicial review. As Rosenfield puts it: ‘in 
heterogeneous societies with various competing conceptions of the good, constitutional 
democracy and adherence to the rule of law may well be indispensable to achieving 
political cohesion with minimum oppression’.153 
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The mechanism by which this occurs has been described as one of “insurance”.154 
Empirically, we expect judicial review to emerge when individuals, groups and political 
parties feel compelled to protect themselves against future and unacceptable political 
risks. The result is a constitutional settlement that requires commitment to mechanisms 
in which all actors accommodate an acceptable, but not excessive, degree of risk. Such 
institutions transform ‘fuzzy uncertainty (where anything is possible)’ into a ‘specific 
assessable risk (of betrayal) that a trustor is prepared to accept’.155  
These risks may be apparent and visible at the time of constitution-making. For example, 
a losing side in an armed conflict, a small political party, or a linguistic minority, may all 
feel particularly vulnerable. In addition, judicial review of basic rights can provide an on-
going means by which a State can legitimate its authority and sustain trust with different 
groups. Constitutional adoption does not imply constitutional acceptance: Violence, 
capital flight, migration, patronage and non-compliance with law (criminal, tax, labour, 
social security law conditions etc.) represent alternatives to submission to authority. 
Judicial review provides one means by which dissent is redirected back into political 
processes by helping ensure that the burdens of compliance are tolerable.  
This function is not limited to the domestic level. International review represents a form 
of insurance. Notably, ratification of international human rights treaties and complaint 
protocols surges in periods of domestic constitutional reform. Morasvic argues that such 
actions exploit the ‘symbolic legitimacy of foreign pressure and international 
institutions to unleash domestic moral opprobrium’.156 As a result, the ‘domestic balance 
shifts in favour of protection of human rights’ as a State ‘seeks to avoid undermining its 
reputation and legitimacy at home or abroad’.157 Further, we might expect judicial 
review to expand at the international level in order to legitimate the growing coercive 
power of new global actors. For example, the adoption of the EU Fundamental Rights 
Charter was justified partly on the grounds that Europeans citizens should be protected 
from adverse decisions by the European Commission.158  
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The political legitimation claim faces, however, four challenges. Each dampens the 
strength and breadth of the argument. First, there may be alternatives to constituting 
and sustaining trust. Judicial review is not the only means to enhance the sociological 
legitimacy of State authority. Other options may be available and function more 
efficiently or effectively: e.g., federalism, regional representation, representation quotas, 
reserved senate seats, affirmative action, advisory councils with veto powers (e.g. for 
indigenous groups), standing, or ad hoc commissions to investigate human rights 
abuses. Constitution-making should not be blind to these options. 
However, the benefit of these alternatives is contingent. When a threat is less distinct 
and stable, and/or a group is geographically and politically dispersed, these approaches 
may be less relevant or feasible. There are likewise risks that specialist institutions will 
ossify over time or face political attack and de-funding. In these circumstances, judicial 
review may be a more practical and durable solution. It is diachronically flexible and 
more deeply institutionalised as a third branch of government. The judicial model may 
also be cheaper, in terms of financial costs as well as “agency costs” or “sovereignty 
costs”. The legal training of judges and their relative insulation from politics with a 
capital P may mean they evince sufficient fidelity to the legal text and the constitutional 
bargain.159  
Secondly, the shape of the insurance mechanism may be warped. Some scholars claim 
that the protection of minority elite interests is the dominant reason for the creation of 
judicial review.160 Hirschl contends that the ‘constitionalization of rights and the 
establishment of judicial review’ are ‘driven in many cases by attempts to maintain the 
social and political status quo and to block attempts to seriously challenge it through 
democratic politics’.161 By way of example, the leading Framers of the US Constitution 
were anxious to institutionalise multiple forms of control, including judicial review, to 
check parliamentary majorities and ‘popular irrational passions’ that would threaten 
property rights and encourage irresponsible fiscal policy.162  
These elitist claims are arguably overstated. Normatively, it is problematic to simply 
associate civil and political rights with elite privilege. For instance, there may be good 
reasons to enshrine the right to property, the most recognised right in the world,163 even 
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if its application has not always been progressive. The right to property has been a 
condition precedent to the establishment or maintenance of mass and social democracy 
(locking in economic elites to the bargain) and an important protection for marginalised 
and indigenous groups, who sometimes face the gravest property rights violations.164  
Empirically, Hirschl’s assertion that elite interests dominate contemporary constitution 
making and treaty ratification is hard to square with all of the evidence. Constitutional 
settlement has often hinged on identity-based questions – e.g., linguistic, religious, or 
political rights for minorities – as well as socio-economic risks for particular groups.165 
In Latin America, and elsewhere, the historical social policy failures of democracies and 
political clientilism generated stronger demands for social rights as a means of re-
orienting politics. While in Sweden (1974) and South Africa (1994), socio-economic 
rights were introduced as a quid pro quo for recognising economic liberties.166  
Thirdly, to what extent will the insurance mechanism materialise in practice? Ginsburg 
deduces that is subject to the balance of power. The extent to which dominant parties 
will accept judicial review is dependent on the extent to which they must evince 
commitment in order to secure authority.167 If power is relatively diffused at the time of 
constitution-making, the insurance model will emerge in a strong form as all parties face 
future risks. If power is more concentrated, its emergence may be dependent on formal 
constraints: e.g., the securing of a supermajority to approve constitutional reform. In 
other words, ‘where constitutions are designed in conditions of political deadlock or 
diffused parties, we should expect strong, accessible judicial review’.168 
Morascvic makes an analogous though transposed argument at the international level.169 
He argues that the emergence of strong judicial review is dependent on the distribution 
of new democracies, strong democracies, and dictatorships. The former will be strong 
supporters, seeking ‘to employ international commitments to consolidate democracy – 
“locking in” the domestic political status quo against their nondemocratic opponents’.170     
However, in strong democracies, the benefits of such insurance weigh less with the 
result that the “sovereignty costs” of international review tip the balance towards an 
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opposition.171 Strong democracies will be joined by more authoritarian States which 
seek to avoid significant challenge to the existing domestic order.  
These rational choice theories provide an empirical check on the extent to which judicial 
review will emerge as an insurance mechanism, formally or substantively. However, 
there may be other causal pathways even when power is not spatially or diachronically 
diffuse. For instance, even if a dominant party is free from constitutional deadlock, it 
may face diffuseness and resistance elsewhere in society. Judicial review may be a 
means of establishing deeper consensus with all groups in society: a regime has to be 
legitimated in practice. At the international level, realist and constructive theories reveal 
how States may be respectively compelled or convinced of the need to establish judicial 
review; ranging from external foreign pressure or incentives to join trade regimes or the 
acculturation and ideational effects of the spread of rights and the rule of law.  
Finally, there is the risk of insincere commitment, particularly if the motivation is 
elicited by once-off deadlock requirements or incentives or short-legitimacy gains. 
Authoritarian States may expand judicial power, adopt bills of rights or ratify 
international treaties simply to distract attention from its repressive apparatus.172 The 
State cloaks itself in the judicial robes of legitimacy.173 Even in strong democracies, this 
risk of a “false positive” exists: international judicial review may be supported simply ‘as 
an export-trade’.174 Many democratic governments supported the ECHR on the basis 
that it was ‘merely a Europeanization of their own national practices’ rather than the 
creation of a new domestic constraint.175 
However, even if judicial review helps shore up a despotic order, legitimises external 
relations, or permits national branding, these commitments may be nonetheless 
significant.176 They represent a Faustian bargain for any governing regime: citizens may 
feel empowered to turn to courts, which may be responsive in turn.177 The European 
Court of Human Rights is a striking example. For instance, the first cases challenging the 
criminalisation of sodomy were filed only two years after the convention came into force 
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in 1953 – a claim that most States certainly did not expect at the time.178 Even in 
authoritarian States can this Faustian bargain transpire and impact social trust. Some 
independent surveys indicate rises in social trust after judicial reforms in China, even if 
the State’s motivations were partly suspect.179 
4.2. Accountability for commitments  
The previous sub-section argued that judicial review can provide one important means 
of legitimating state power and establishing social trust. We now turn to the most 
common functional justification for judicial review, which is accountability. It is related 
to the idea of insurance and social trust, as discussed above, but is different in purpose 
and nature. It is neither concerned with inducing participation in a polity nor fostering 
social cohesion and trust between particular groups within society. Rather, the objective 
is to ensure that commitments to rights are honoured, which is to be achieved 
regardless of which groups originally promoted their recognition. As Raz writes, a 
‘natural way to proceed is to assume that the enforcement of fundamental rights should 
be entrusted to whichever political decision-procedure is, in the circumstances of the 
time and place, most likely to enforce them well, with the fewest adverse side effects’.180 
The classical lines of the accountability argument are well-rehearsed in a recent article 
by Fallon: courts must possess the opportunity to invalidate legislation, not because they 
of their interpretive prowess, but because the existence of legislation, rather than its 
absence, is likely to be more harmful to rights.181 The function of judicial review is 
simply to provide an additional veto check against potential harms.182 However, Fallon’s 
reasoning is partly flawed. The straight line that he draws between his premise (best 
protection of rights possible) and his method (invalidation of legislation) comes easily 
undone. What if legislation is seeking to positively protect rights? Such rights might 
include personal security, fair trial, political participation, socio-economic rights, and 
even many property rights. In such instances, judicial review risks being irrelevant or 
even counterproductive if it leads to rights-protecting legislation being struck down on 
the basis that it conflicts with negative rights.  
Waldron – to whom Fallon is responding – warns precisely of the consequences of such 
lopsided rights protections if positive rights are excluded from judicial review. He states: 
                                                        
178 Paul Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 
2013). The Court eventually struck down such laws in 1981 in Dudgeon v United Kingdom Application No. 
7525/76 (4 October 2007).   
179 Ethan Michelson and Ke Li, Judicial Performance without Independence: The Delivery of Justice and 
Political. Legitimacy in Rural China, Workshop on Works-in-Progress on Chinese Law, Center for Chinese 
Legal Studies, Columbia Law School, May 9, 2012.. 
180 Joseph  Raz, 'Disagreement in Politics' (1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25, 45. 
181 Fallon (n 16). ‘In a nutshell, the best case for judicial review in political and morally healthy societies 
does not rest on (as has often been asserted) on the idea that courts are more likely than legislatures to 
make correct decisions’. ibid, 1695. Emphasis in original. 
182 ‘The best case, as Frank Cross has also argued, rests on the subtly different ground that legislatures and 
courts should both be enlisted in protecting fundamental rights, and that both should have veto powers 
over legislation that might reasonably be thought to violate such rights’. ibid.  
Malcolm Langford – Why Judicial Review?  71 
The text of a Bill of Rights may distort judicial reasoning not only by what 
it includes but also by what it omits. Suppose the members of a given 
society disagree about whether the Bill of Rights should have included 
positive (socioeconomic) as well as negative (liberty) rights.... Judges may 
give more weight to property rights or to freedom of contract, say, than 
they would if property and freedom of contract were posited alongside 
explicit welfare rights. And giving them greater weight may lead judges to 
strike down statutes that ought not to be struck down—statutes that are 
trying to make up the deficiency and implement by legislation those rights 
that failed to register in the formulations of the Bill of Rights.183 
Fallon is aware of the problem and introduces a number of caveats. He assumes that 
such legislation would not come into conflict with ‘fundamental rights” (assuming 
economic rights, such as property and the like, are not included within a constitution) 
and that courts should refrain adjudicating cases which raise conflicts of rights. Yet 
these concessions allow Tushnet, largely rightly but somewhat excessively so, to argue 
that Fallon’s case for judicial review becomes highly restricted (and largely 
indistinguishable from Waldron’s limited acceptance of judicial review). This is because 
there are regular conflicts between rights and the exclusion of economic liberties is 
pragmatically difficult.184  
What Tushnet does not do is articulate how Fallon’s model might have been 
reformulated to avoid or mitigate its internal inconsistencies.185 The way to proceed is 
not to confuse or conflate accountability with a particular political theory, which in 
Fallon’s case is a Lockean stream of political liberalism that stresses negative liberty – 
‘the absence of coercion by others’.186 Judicial accountability as an idea resonates in 
broad a range of political theories and traditions. It even appears in some versions of 
republican liberty. Eliminating domination requires positive action since inferior status 
makes freedom tenuous and contingent. Judicial review could help disperse power and 
build such positive freedom. As Pettit puts it:187  
[B]eing included, having an audible voice, does not reduce to being 
satisfactorily represented. What is even more important, especially with 
the administration and judiciary, is that there is room for you and those of 
the relevant kind to protest to the representative bodies in question, in the 
event of your believing that things have not been properly done. You must 
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be able to complain and appeal; you must be able to state a grievance and 
demand satisfaction. 
Likewise, accountability can be justified by liberal contractarian theories. Behind a veil 
of ignorance, individuals are likely to choose a set of institutional arrangements that 
realise basic and material interests. As Føllesdal states: 
Liberal Contractualism grants that democratic, majority rule among 
elected and accountable representatives may be one important 
mechanism to ensure the protection and furtherance of the best interests 
of citizens. But other arrangements may also be required, such as super-
majoritarian features, constraints and checks on parliament and 
government of various kinds. There is no prima facie normative 
preference for unrestrained parliaments.188 
This overlapping consensus of perspectives suggests that it is useful to begin with a 
general concept of accountability. The notion has become, admittedly, ubiquitous. There 
is market accountability, criminal accountability, shareholder accountability etc. 
However, political accountability contains, at least, the compelling idea that intuitional 
or powerful actors must take responsibility for their commitments. It requires that they 
explain and justify their actions (answerability) and be subject to sanctions if their 
conduct or explanation for it is found wanting (enforceability).189  
This definition helps in broadening our understanding of the role of courts. On the one 
hand, it is concerned with the material enforcement of particular rights for certain 
individuals. The South African Constitutional Court clarifies its role in this regard in 
striking down the death penalty: ‘The very reason for establishing the new legal order, 
and for vesting the power of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect 
the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through 
the democratic process.’190  
On the other hand, it is equally concerned with scrutinising decision-making or the lack 
thereof: in other words, answerability. This answerability function can have broader 
systemic effects: ‘courts serve as information generating function that facilitates the 
accountability of the various parts of the State (or even private providers) to each other, 
using formal rights and their judicial gloss as yardsticks’.191 The earlier discussion of 
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religious freedom jurisprudence is illustrative. The State was forced to confront and 
answer the question as to whether seemingly neutral eligibility rules for social security 
and drug prohibition caused unjustifiable harm to conscientious religious minorities. 
Courts provide a mechanism that requires answerability, State reconsideration, and 
response.192 One can certainly quibble with the outcome in any of the US Supreme Court 
judgments, but all judgments served this function.193 
These twin features of accountability can work likewise for more positive rights or 
obligations. Take the seminal case of Airey v Ireland before the ECtHR.194 The complexity 
of Irish divorce laws meant the dissolution of marriage was unattainable for those 
spouses unable to afford and retain a lawyer. The Court refrained from challenging the 
stringency and complexity of the divorce law but forced the State to be accountable for 
its inequitable consequences: in practice, not all citizens possessed a right to a fair trial 
and respect for family life. The result was the subsequent creation by the Irish 
government of a system of civil legal aid for family matters.195  
This accountability function of judicial review also helps clarify certain intriguing 
features of rights litigation. A large number of cases do not concern the invalidation or 
absence of legislation. Rather, they involve claims for implementation of existing 
legislation. In this modus, the distinction between judicial and administrative review 
becomes blurred. In jurisdictions as diverse as India, Colombia, and the ECtHR, the bulk 
of cases concerns rights-related statutory commitments. Why do litigants turn to judicial 
review, via constitutional and treaty rights, in such cases? The reason seems to be that it 
empowers them to leverage a more effective response from governments, which may be 
impervious to weak or highly individualised administrative remedies.  
Two challenges stand out for the accountability claim. The first is relevance. Why should 
a State with a relatively strong record on rights supervision, which has been achieved 
with minimal judicial engagement, be tasked with the institution? Many rights-rich 
democracies might fear that judicial review will unleash a flood of frivolous, vexatious, 
or excessively idealistic claims rather than play any significant accountability role.196 
Take the hard case: the Nordic countries. They sit atop most global indexes on civil, 
social, and political rights.197 Thus, why should Sweden, a State without a tradition of 
domestic judicial review, feel compelled to embrace the practice or ratify international 
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mechanisms? Or why should Norway, whose tradition of judicial review has been 
limited to a small number of civil rights and a doctrine of deference in property rights 
cases, be expected to expand its remit of review?198 As Hirschl argues: 
Variations on a combination of well-established, ex-ante parliamentary 
preview and restrained ex post judicial review, deployed in the Nordic 
region, have proven effective in mitigating the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty embedded in excessive judicial review and ensuring an 
alternative, nonjuristocratic way of going about protecting rights.199 
Yet, even in these States, it is possible to mount a claim for judicial accountability. The 
first is the danger of atrophy and backsliding. Many of these States face new challenges 
in upholding rights protections due to increasing social diversification (especially 
through immigration) and worsening economic conditions, with the current exception in 
Norway. It is not clear that existing mechanisms of protection are always sufficient. The 
second is that the picture of Nordic success on civil and social rights must be nuanced in 
light of various and significant rights violations, particularly with regard to the 
treatment of Roma,200 Sami,201 institutionalised children,202 prisoners,203 and suspected 
communists.204 The Nordic countries do not possess a clean slate before the European 
Court of Human Rights and many judgments reveal violations that may not be systemic 
and grave as elsewhere but certainly worthy of condemnation.205 For these States, 
judicial review permits civil society to help “perfect” the realisation of rights and 
democracy - 206 an opportunity used increasingly by mainstream Nordic civil society 
organisations, social movements, and specialist legal support structures.207 
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Beyond this materialist defence, the adoption of domestic and international review may 
strengthen accountability efforts elsewhere in the world. By expressing a symbolic 
commitment to judicial review, other States are encouraged or pressured to submit to 
similar institutions and comply with their judgments. 208  Many rights-confident 
democracies express their decision to internationally self-bind in largely these terms.209 
Now, this symbolic defence is “other-regarding”, which may make it prone to questions 
over its relevance (there are multiple States) and instrumental justification (States seem 
to gain diffuse benefits but carry specific “sovereignty” costs). However, it is important 
to note that rights promotion may also be justified on instrumental grounds:210 
Promotion of political rights may reduce armed conflicts and military and humanitarian 
expenditures;211 civil rights may improve the conditions for foreign investment;212 and 
social rights may level the playing field for international trade.213 It can also strengthen 
the call by these States in bilateral relations and development cooperation for rule of law 
reforms while also ensuring that they do not constitute a precedent for authoritarian or 
democratically fragile States.214 
The second principal challenge to the accountability argument is effectiveness. Are 
courts actually able to deliver? Will judges be responsive to rights claims and will 
compliance and broader impact follow their decisions? Or more particularly, will courts 
be at least effective as realistic alternatives to judicial review in ensuring accountability 
in practice?  
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Various critical theories claim that courts will be biased towards elite and/or the middle 
class. A distributive bias may be structural in origin. Advantaged groups are better able 
to secure access to legal representation, strategically maximise the benefits of repeat 
litigation, and accommodate the institutional passivity and duration of court-based 
procedure.215 Or it may be attitudinal: courts are swayed by their personal ideologies 
that are likely to be elitist in orientation.216 They seek to maintain the social and political 
status quo217 or are swayed by the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism. 218 However, 
the evidence is mixed and complex on distributive bias. Courts also regularly side with 
marginalised groups in many states while research indicates that the benefits of 
decisions can be spread over multiple groups.219 Judicial fairness or responsiveness is a 
function of multiple factors, not least the nature of reviewable rights, the appointment 
processes for the judiciary, forms of access to justice, and the inflection of background 
public policy and political economy conditions.220 Thus the institutional design and 
trajectory of judicial review and its trajectory is as important as its existence.   
The same applies to the general effects of courts. Realist claims that courts, without the 
power of purse or sword, are unable to catalyse material impacts need to be examined 
carefully.221 A court’s coercive and authoritative capacities can be mobilised directly 
(through the crafting of appropriate remedies) or indirectly (through social mobilisation 
or bureaucratic/elite alliances) to advance the realisation of rights and control/direct 
state power. A growing array of comparative studies reveal the ability of courts to 
conditionally leverage change, from the reduction of hunger and homelessness through 
to the advancement of prisoner rights and rights to sexual orientation and gender 
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identity.222 Even at the international level institutionalist studies that foreground the 
role of political power and judicial legitimacy have found that enforceability is 
contingent on the ability of actors to leverage international judgments in domestic 
politics.223 While this empirical research should certainly dampen the enthusiasm of 
some scholars and advocates for the accountability function of courts, it evinces at least 
that such an institutional project can be much more than a forlorn hope. 
4.3. Structured public deliberation  
The final argument for judicial review is that courts can help structure public 
deliberation on rights through its role in the “constitutional order”. In explaining this 
functional motivation, I will first dismiss two related claims: democracy and rule of law.  
4.3.1. Democracy  
It is not uncommon to find functional arguments that judicial review constitutes or 
promotes democracy.224 The strong form of the claim is that the two are synonymous. 
According to Dworkin, the ‘defining aim of democracy’ is ‘that collective decisions … 
treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect’, and 
the latter is what judicial review achieves.225 The moderate form is that judicial review 
enhances democratic representation, participation or deliberation, especially for 
disenfranchised or marginalised groups.  
Both contentions seem problematic. As to the strong form, collapsing judicial review into 
a single category of democracy unhelpfully dissolves longstanding analytical categories. 
It either shifts the debate over the democratic legitimacy of judicial review to another 
linguistic space or occludes important democratic concerns with judicial review.226 It is 
more practical to restrict our understanding of democracy to ensuring ‘equal voice and 
decision-making’. This can be contrasted with mechanisms that seek to realise ‘equal 
concern and respect’, which may be justifiable on democratic or other grounds.  
As to the moderate form, I remain unconvinced that the contribution of judicial review 
to democracy is really a motivating rather than a mitigatory factor. It can be argued, with 
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some persuasion, that judicial review does make an empirical contribution to the 
practice of representative,227 participatory,228 and deliberative229 democracy. For some 
individuals and groups, it may constitute the only form of democratic participation. 
However, as judicial review also acts to restrict certain aspects of democracy (such as 
majoritarianism), its overall contribution or effect may be potentially negligible. Thus, I 
struggle to see improved democracy as a driving argument for motivating judicial 
review.  
The possible exception to this stance might be that courts are sometimes called upon to 
play a larger role in society, where it is specifically required. For example, Geoff 
Budlender argues that courts in South Africa must be part of the process of 
‘democratisation’ of society: they possess this ‘function’ alongside other pillars.230 
Another approach is to see democracy as an external requirement in rights 
interpretation and enforcement. We require courts to incorporate democracy in their 
proceedings and vision as a way of achieving the material and participatory elements of 
social rights.  
4.3.2. Rule of law  
Equally, the idea of rule of law is raised as a justification for judicial review. It often 
serves as a shorthand for both expressing and validating the idea of constitutional 
democracy. However, as an analytical concept, it operates poorly as a defence of judicial 
review. In English at least, it fuses the idea of rule through law (all power must be 
exercised in accordance with law - the etat légal) with rule by law (all laws must 
conform to constitutional values and such disputes shall be settled by law - the etat de 
droit).231 The former conception has no relevance to judicial review: it legitimises only 
judicial scrutiny of executive compliance with general laws. The latter and substantive 
conception merely echoes the more precise idea of accountability for constitutional or 
treaty commitments.  
The most convincing use of rule of law to defend judicial review is the demand for legal 
coherence in the face of hermeneutic anarchy. In politically fragmented regimes with 
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dispersed powers, legal certainty may be elusive if each constitutional entity can 
articulate and act upon its own constitutional interpretation. Indeed, it may be 
prudential for these entities to cooperate through a system of authoritative judicial 
review, which minimises transaction costs and safeguards desired interpretations. The 
need for legal certainty was acutely felt in the early constitutional debates in the United 
States.232 In the context of federalism, Congressman Webster stated: 
[C]ould anything be more preposterous than to make a government for the 
whole Union, and yet leave its power subject, not to one interpretation, but 
to thirteen, or twenty-four, interpretations? …. Each (government) at 
liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of 
others.233 
This “fragmentation”-based argument for judicial review might also apply in political 
systems characterised by strict separation of governing powers between a president and 
legislature. It would certainly apply in the highly decentred context of international 
relations, avoiding the anarchy of multiple State interpretations – subject to the 
constraint that more powerful actors may strategically defect from such an interpretive 
regime (e.g. through non-compliance or reservations) or refrain from the initial 
commitment.234 
Legal fragmentation may occur even in more centred systems, such as a Westminster 
parliamentary system. The choice is not always simply between the legislature and the 
courts as to who will provide legal coherence and certainty. In some areas, law may 
remain vague, thin, contradictory, or obsolete but political, public or private actors may 
lack incentives, resources, or time to help resolve the uncertainty. The result is everyday 
legal pluralism which judges may be called on to resolve. The breadth of this 
phenomenon varies within and across a legal system but indeterminacy is, nonetheless, 
an inherent feature of law.235  
This indeterminacy can continue even when one branch of government is given the final 
authority over law or the constitution or treaty. A form of dialogue exists although one 
institution may dominate. Even in the United States, where the court jealously guards its 
final interpretive authority, a form of dialogue exists between the courts and 
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government over time and issues. 236  Conversely, under a traditional system of 
parliament sovereignty with no judicial review, the British courts have developed and 
enforced constitutional norms.237  
4.3.3. Structured public debate  
The way to capture some of the underlying ideas of judicial review as a promotional tool 
for democracy or the rule of law is again to think of courts in institutional rather than 
textual terms. In this case, the interaction of institutions is as important as their legal 
production and outcomes. Instead of viewing the exercise of rights interpretation as 
mere resolution of doctrine and disputes, it can be equally understood as the facilitation 
of a “constitutional order”. It is a space in which society in general and actors in 
particular narrow the applicable rules of interpretation and find a common ground to 
debate and settle law in relations defined by flux rather than constancy. This is precisely 
the case where there is space for ex post adjustment of a constitution or treaty.  
The general notion of a constitutional order is well articulated by Sabel. He speaks not 
specifically of political constitutions but rather of a particular legally-sanctioned power 
relation. A constitutional order is to be distinguished from two other relational forms in 
society: horizontal market exchange and vertical hierarchy. 238  It represents a 
background architecture of social and political rules that create and frame power and 
governance mechanisms. In Sabel’s view, the virtue of a constitutional order is that it 
helps mediate conflicts and overcomes inertia that develop in vertical and horizontal 
orderings of power. For example, in contracts, commercial parties may bypass 
negotiation on detailed supply arrangements and instead create a constitutional order 
with an open-ended contract that sets the parameters for on-going supply.  
These arrangements create frameworks in which parties negotiate and deliberate within 
the shadow of legal sanction. Sabel contends that the ‘monitoring’ dimension ‘reduces 
the possibility of duplicity’ but that its ‘central function is to regularize consultation 
between the parties so as to minimize the cost of mistakes and maximise the possibility 
of introducing improvements that benefit both’.239 Likewise, constitutional orders 
possess a jurisprudential role. Through different forms of “jurisprudence” they help 
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negotiate change over time - especially where exchange may be unfair or bureaucratic 
hierarchies too slow.240 
The idea of a constitutional order is not exclusive. Parliaments, executives, and a range 
of regulatory and oversight institutions create such frameworks for on-going 
deliberation, consensus building, and jurisprudence creation, whether formal or 
customary, written or oral. In the field of water regulation, for example, a legislature 
may eschew detailed regulation and plump for elected water councils with the authority 
to decide on local policy within parameters.241  
Arguably, courts provide a useful mechanism for such an order, and not only in 
interpretation of statutory, common and customary law but also in constitutional and 
international law. Courts can shape public deliberation and provide a jurisprudence that 
provides both institutional memory and a body of principles that can help solve future 
disputes. At its functional core, the presence of a court with judicial review powers 
presses citizens and political actors to deliberate on rights in a particular way: it 
narrows the space of potential rights claims; excludes certain types of arguments; 
favours principled reasoning; ensures some consistency with prior reasoning; enables a 
modicum of reflection; and pushes actors to match reasons and principles with others in 
the constitutional orders.  
In many instances, a court will not review a dispute or problem; but the shadow of the 
legal sanction structures the space for public deliberation.242 The fact that the court can 
have a final or decisive word changes the shape of the political discussion. The rights 
dimension demands consideration. This can arguably trigger both debates over moral 
understandings of rights and legal discussions over how a court should or may judge. 
The threat of judicial review concentrates the mind of the body politic. 
Friedman’s history of the US Supreme Court provides such an example. He finds that 
over the longue duree, the court largely matches public opinion, but not because the 
court is a relentless majoritarian actor. Rather, over time, the structured engagement 
between the court and the public produces a form of consensus. In his words: 
Judicial review serves as a catalyst for the American people to debate as a 
polity some of the most difficult and fundamental issues that confront 
them. It forces the American people to reach answers to these questions, 
to find solutions - often compromises – that obtain broad and lasting 
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support. And it is only when the people have done so that the Court tends 
to come in line with public opinion.243  
This is consistent with many contemporary studies on the impact of public opinion 
triggered by judgments of the US Supreme Court and some other national courts (Russia 
and South Africa). While early observational and experimental studies cast significant 
doubt on the capacity of judges to lead public opinion244 or to do so without 
polarisation,245 a wave of subsequent studies paint a much more nuanced picture.246  
Courts can lead public opinion but the direction and intensity of attitudinal shifts varies 
amongst different individuals and groups247 and certain factors condition the general 
effects.248,Importantly, shifts in public opinion can be diachronically complex as charted 
by Friedman. For instance, Ura finds a short-term and negative thermostatic reaction 
flowing from the US Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v Wade but a long-run movement 
towards the Court’s positions, suggesting that legitimation effects can be slow to 
materialise.249 
Burke and Carter identify in a similar fashion how judges can usefully structure this 
public deliberation, drawing in essence on a court’s informational exposure, decisional 
seclusion, and legal method. Tracking the emotionally charged Schiavo case concerning 
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the right of a husband to request termination of life support for his spouse, they 
conclude that:  
[T]he political process never pinpointed what the “the subject” was in a 
way that allowed people on both sides of the issue to come to closure. 
Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, proceeded to articulate precise 
and neatly sequenced questions, each one framed so that the answer, 
whether one agreed with it or not, seemed plausible. You will also see in 
the legal process, an openness to new ideas, new information, and the 
abiding sense that neither side was “right”, or “the winner” until the 
process finally ended, over 15 years after it began – qualities clearly 
absent in the debate outside the courtroom.250  
Likewise, international relations scholars identify this function of international review 
in triggering change. International courts serve ‘as an external signalling devise to 
trigger an appropriate domestic response’, 251  ‘contribute to political change by 
deligimitizing circumspect arguments used by powerful state actors’,252 and provide an 
‘authoritative (re)interpretation of what the law means’.253 
In this sense, the process is analogous to Rawl’s idea of considered judgments: courts 
help reduce problematic biases and inconsistencies in public reasoning. Considered 
judgments are those which are made ‘under conditions in which our capacity for 
judgment is most likely to have been fully exercised and not affected by distorting 
influence’.254 Courts can push society at least towards a ‘narrow reflective equilibrium’: 
actors will be forced to trim or discard claims that make it difficult to cohere ‘general 
convictions, first principles and particular judgments’.255 Courts could even move actors 
towards a ‘wide’ reflective equilibrium, the best conception of justice after all 
alternatives have been weighed. Although, as argued in section 2, there are clear limits 
to positing that political or judicial institutions may reach ideal or best conceptions of 
justice as embodied in constitutional rights.256 
Contemporary constitutionalism has also added a further element to this deliberation - 
the promotion of constitutional values. Robertson argues that contemporary 
constitutions are marked by this ideational ambition: ‘My claim is that constitutional 
review is a mechanism for permeating all regulated aspects of society with a set of 
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values inherent in the constitutional agreement the society has accepted’.257 The South 
African constitution is commonly described in this vein, as a transformative 
constitution;258and South African judges have recognised partly this transformative role 
in diffusing their values through their reasoning and remedial relief.259 Arguably, many 
of the constitutions of the third wave democracies and some of the second wave 
democracies fall within this transformational category; as do recent international 
human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Again though, it is possible to imagine alternatives to a court. Yet possibly, the 
institutional features of judicial review provide functional reasons why it might be an 
important body to play in framing public deliberation and decisions over rights. Instead 
of seeing legal precedent as a form of retrograde moral reasoning, it can be re-framed as 
a form of institutional memory: providing a baseline for future interpretations. If courts 
are also disposed to adjusting and updating their interpretations as appropriate, then a 
fine (but sometimes messy) balance might be achieved.260 Moreover, the bias towards 
principle-based reasons provides a means to ensure mutually acceptable forms of public 
deliberation. The debate is less about policy ends or means but about the consistent 
application of particular principles, which forces opponents to narrow and alter the 
frame of ideological disagreement.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This article asked what should motivate judicial review? Powers to interpret or enforce 
rights could just as easily be given to a council of philosophers, a panel of randomly 
appointed ordinary citizens, an independent committee of an upper house of parliament, 
or a lower house in a legislature. Epistemological justifications, which have dominated 
political and legal theory for the past few decades, provide part of the answer. It may be 
possible to claim adjudicators are more epistemologically reliable on account of their 
particularist form of adjudication, the semi-public forum of adjudication and the bias 
towards principled forms of reasoning. However, this justification faces the problem that 
these features are not always suitable for reliable interpretation: we need interpreters 
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to take account of general considerations and realise that legal methods may not always 
be appropriate. Moreover, it is certainly not clear that adjudicators always get it “right” 
in practice. There is in addition the risk that it contributes to the idea of judicial 
infallibility, which encourages either blind adherence or unnecessary judicial restraint.  
Functional arguments shift the debate out of the epistemic quagmire and the search for 
truth-finding institutions. It places the focus on the more earthly reasons for the 
existence of judicial review: the building of social trust through regime legitimation, 
accountability for commitments, and the deliberative potential of constitutional orders. 
Many of the supposed epistemic advantages of courts might be best reframed as 
functional ones as they help ensure these outcomes. These instrumental benchmarks are 
also more liable to measurement against actual practice and may also more clearly point 
to reforms and improvement of adjudication as the intended function is clear and 
determinable. Nonetheless, it is evident that a functional approach faces its own 
challenges, in particular whether the empirical assumptions behind it hold in practice.  
 
